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ABSTRACT 
There will be a substantial increase in the number of 
spent fuel shipments on the nation ' s  highway system in the 
next thirty years . Most of the spent fuel will be moving 
from reactors to a spent fuel repository. This study 
develops two models which evaluate the risk and cost of 
moving the spent fuel . The Minimum Total Transport Risk 
Model (MTTRM) seeks an efficient solution for this problem 
by finding the minimum risk path through the network and 
sending all the spent fuel shipments over this one path. 
The Equilibrium Transport Risk Model ( ETRM) finds an 
equitable solution by distributing the shipments over a 
number of paths in the network . This model decreases the 
risk along individual paths , but increases society ' s  risk 
because the spent fuel shipments are traveling over more 
links in the network . 
The study finds that there is a trade off between path 
risk and societal risk . As path risk declines , societal 
risk rises . The cost of shipping also increases as the 
number of paths expand . 
vi 
The cost and risk of shipping spent fuel from ten 
reactors to four potential repository sites are evaluated 
using the MTTRM. The temporary monitored retrievable 
storage (MRS) facility in Tennessee is found to be the 
minimum cost and minimum risk solution. When direct 
shipment to the permanent sites is considered, Deaf Smith, 
Texas is the least cost and least incident free transport 
risk location . 
location when 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada is the least risk 
the focus is placed on the potential 
consequences of an accident on surrounding population or 
property. 
The MTTRM and ETRM provide decision makers at all 
levels of government with a tool to evaluate the risk of 
shipping spent fuel . Each level of government and location 
in the country will have its own preference in the 
distribution of this risk . 
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CHAPTER 1 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION 
Introduction 
By the year 2000 , the United States will see a 
substantial upsurge in the movement of high level 
radioactive spent fuel on its highways . Most of this spent 
fuel will be moving from nuclear reactors , where it is now 
stored, to a permanent repository site or an interim 
storage facility . The purpose of this dissertation is to 
develop two models for evaluating the risk in transporting 
spent fuel along highways , where risk is measured by the 
expected exposure to radiation. The solutions generated by 
these two models should aid decision makers in choosing 
among various routing options . To understand the uses of 
the routing models , it is first helpful to briefly review 
the background of the nuclear power industry and the 
regulations governing the movement of spent fuel . 
2 
Background of the Nuclear Power Industry 
History 
The construction of the first nuclear power plants 
began in the United States in the 1950s (USDOT , 1980) . The 
f irst commercial nuclear power plant to go on line was the 
Shippingsport reactor near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1957 
(Beck et al . , 1984) . By 1985 , eighty-six nuclear power 
plants had been completed and were operating . S ixty 
additional plants have construction permits and ,  thirty of 
these are likely to be completed ( Panel on Social and 
Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Management ,  1984 and 
USDOE, 1985b) . 
The nuclear power plants which are currently being 
constructed and those which are already in operation in the 
United States are, for the most part , located east of the 
Mississippi River (Figure 1 . 1 ) .  The maj or concentrations 
are found in the Atlantic coastal states and the states 
surrounding the Great Lakes . The Pacific coast states also 
have a small number of reactors . The Great Plains and 
Rocky Mountain states are more sparsely settled and have 
other energy sources such as coal , oil,  and natural gas . 
As a result , there are few nuclear power plants located in 
these two regions . 
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Nuclear power has only become a significant part of 
America ' s  energy supply since the early 1970s 
( Congressional Research Services , 1977 ) .  Nuclear power 
plants currently generate 140 gigawatts of electricity,  and 
by 1990 , energy production will increase to 182 gigawatts 
( 1  gigawatt = 1 million kilowatts ) (USDOT, 1980) . As the 
production of electricity by nuclear power plants 
increases , so does the amount of spent fuel . 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
The nuclear fuel cycle is a two phase process : 
( 1 )  provision of fuel to reactors and ( 2 )  disposal of spent 
fuel . The first phase of the cycle is called the front 
end . It involves the mining and milling of ore, conversion 
and enrichment of the uranium, fuel fabrication into rods , 
and installation of the rods in the nuclear power plant . 
The first stage of the processing from mining to milling 
usually takes place within a very short distance because 
only one percent of the uranium ore is uranium oxide, the 
source of nuclear fuel . Each of the steps beyond the 
milling process takes place in widely divergent parts of 
the country. The relatively low weight and high value of 
the processed uranium makes it a profitable commodity to 
ship over long distances (Rhoads , 1977 ) .  
5 
The fuel rods normally stay in the reactor for a 
period of three years (USDOE, 1986) . The back end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle begins when the energy producing ability 
of the fuel rods has been depleted . At this point, the 
highly radioactive rods must be removed from the reactor 
and deposited in a storage area. Reactors have temporary 
storage facilities on their premises , but the capacity of 
many of these older nuclear power plants to handle this 
spent fuel is diminishing because they are running out of 
on-site storage space ( Jacob and Kirby, 1985 ) . This 
situation has been eased somewhat by the shipment of spent 
fuel between various reactor storage facilities (De Steese 
and Rhoads , 1978) . Some irradiated fuel is also being 
shipped to the 
Morris , Illinois 
1983 ) . 
former nuclear fuel reprocessing plants at 
and West Valley, New York (Resnikoff ,  
By 1985 , 1 0 , 000 metric tons of spent fuel had 
accumulated at temporary reactor storage facilities . By 
the year 2000 , the quantity of spent fuel will grow to 
40 , 000 metric tons . Eventually , the spent fuel must be 
removed to a permanent storage facility where it will need 
10 , 000 years to decay to a safe state (Beck et al . ,  1984 ) . 
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In addition to the spent fuel generated by the nuclear 
power plants run by utilities , there are a number of other 
generating sources . Fuel from eighty smaller research and 
isotope manufacturing reactors is being transported to 
government facilities at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) 
near Aiken , South Carolina and the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory ( INEL) near Idaho Falls , Idaho . The 
United States also accepts spent fuel from foreign 
reactors . Most of this fuel enters the United States at 
Portsmouth, Virginia and is shipped to the SRP or the 
INEL . Other shipments are trucked into the United States 
from Canada . Finally, the military has 156 nuclear 
reactors , 128 of which are used on submarines and aircraft 
carriers . Spent fuel from these reactors is shipped 
directly to the INEL facility from eight shipyards 
(Resnikoff ,  1983 ) . 
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 gives the 
Department of Energy (DOE) the responsibility for 
establishing permanent repository sites for spent fuel . 
Eventually , there will be two sites selected for permanent 
storage . The first repository will have a capacity of up 
to 70 , 000 metric tons (Graham, 1984 ) . The candidate 
locations for the first site are Deaf Smith County, Texas , 
Hanford, Washington , and Yucca Mountain, Nevada (USDOE 
7 
1984a, USDOE 1984b, and USDOE 1984c) ( Figure 1 . 2 ) . The 
final decision on the first repository should be made by 
DOE in 1990 
Radioactive 
( Panel On Social and 
Waste Management , 
Economic Aspects of 
1984 ) . After the 
construction of the facility is completed, in 1998 , spent 
fuel shipments should show a marked increase in number and 
distance traversed because the spent fuel will be 
transferred from reactor sites across the United States to 
the repository (Table 1 . 1 ) .  
S ince most reactors are located in the East and the 
potential repository site locations are found in the West, 
substantial distances must be traversed in order to move 
the spent fuel to its final resting place (De Steese and 
Rhoads , 1978 and Jacob and Kirby, 1985) . The Great Plains 
and Rocky Mountain states are particularly concerned about 
the final selection of the first repository location 
because some of them will likely be corridors for the 
shipment of spent fuel from the reactors to the site which 
is chosen (Nuclear Waste Transportation, 1984) . They will 
be bearing much of the transport risk of nuclear power, 
without receiving many of the benefits ( Zeigler et al . ,  
1984) . 
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Table 1 . 1  
ANNUAL NUMBER OF SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS 
Year Number 
1980 96 
1985 520 
1990 1 , 085 
1998-2025 6 , 405 annually 
Source: Resnikoff ,  Marvin . The Next Nuclear Gamble . New 
York : Council on Economic Priorities , 1983 . 
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DOE has also proposed the construction of an interim 
storage facility for spent fuel (USDOE. 1985c) . This 
monitored retrievable storage (MRS )  facility would be used 
to collect the spent fuel from the reactors . The fuel 
would be repackaged into uniform containers and placed in 
temporary storage facilities until the permanent repository 
is f inished . The fuel would then be loaded on unit trains 
and shipped to the permanent repository site . Three 
candidate sites in Tennessee have been selected by DOE for 
the MRS facility . Two are near Oak Ridge and the third 
site is at the abandoned Hartsville nuclear power plant . 
Spent fuel shipments are made by truck . rail .  and 
barge . Current estimates show that approximately thirty 
percent of the spent fuel in the United States will be 
moving by truck when the MRS faci lity or permanent 
repository is completed (Hoskins . 1985 and USDOE. 198Sc) . 
Regulations Governing the Movement of Spent Fuel 
Federal Regulatory Agencies 
Responsibility at the federal level for the safe 
transport 
Department 
Regulatory 
of radioactive material lies primari ly with the 
of Transportation (DOT) and the Nuclear 
Conunission (NRC) . A "Memorandum of 
Understanding" between the two agencies was signed in 1966 
and revised in 1973 . 
11 
This memorandum divides the 
regulatory authority over radioactive material movements 
between them. DOT is responsible for regulating the safety 
standards in the shipment of radioactive material ,  while 
the NRC regulates the packaging design, construction , and 
testing standards (Rhoads , 1977) . Some routing regulations 
overlap the jurisdiction of both agencies . 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations 
In 1979 , the NRC ' s  Office of Nuclear Safety and 
Safeguards published regulations requiring shippers of high 
level radioactive materials such as spent fuel to avoid 
movements through or near metropolitan areas of 100 , 000 or 
more population. An exception would be made to this ban 
if : ( 1 )  no peripheral highway route was authorized for 
trucks ; ( 2 )  any other route would result in an excessive 
increase in travel time; or ( 3 )  other highways were not as 
safe as the ones running through the population center . 
The degree of safety on the highway would be determined by 
its quality, the accident rate, and the volume of traffic . 
If movement through the urban area is approved by the NRC, 
additional measures would be required for the shipment . 
These measures would include armed escorts , nonstop travel 
12 
through the city, and the exclusive use of interstates 
(Kasun, 1979 ) . 
Department of Transportation Regulations 
In 1980 , the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) of 
the DOT adopted a similar set of rules . These regulations 
state that any truck carrying a large quantity of 
radioactive material is required to operate a on preferred 
route . A preferred route is any highway designated as such 
by the appropriate state agency and any interstate highway 
which has not been replaced by a state designated route . 
Data collected by the Federal Highway Administration 
shows that the chances of having an accident involving an 
injury or a fatality on an interstate are 75 percent less 
than that of a noninterstate highway . S ince the 
interstates have been proven safer, the MTB requires that 
motor carriers hauling spent fuel stay on these arteries as 
much as possible ( FR7 149, January 3 1 ,  1980) . 
The rules also require that a truck carrying high 
level radioactive material use a circumferential interstate 
route around an urban center, if one exists . If no 
interstate bypass exists , states can designate any highway 
of interstate quality which goes around the central city as 
a preferred route . If neither case exists , then the 
13 
shipment would move through the central city interstate 
(FR7140 , January 31 , 1980 ) .  
The regulation requiring 
radioactive material move on 
around central cities results 
that large shipments of 
interstate bypass routes 
in a trade off between 
increased distance and lower population density . Given 
similar road conditions, the results of this policy would 
be increased exposure for the transport crew and greater 
probability that an accident will occur because of the 
longer distances traveled . On the other hand, the lower 
population density along the interstate will result in less 
normal exposure for the general population and diminished 
consequences if an accident does occur ( FR7145 , January 31 , 
1980 ) . That is, there is a trade off between path length 
and potential exposure . 
State and Local Regulations 
State and local legislative bodies have become more 
concerned about the regulation of hazardous material 
movements through their own jurisdictions as the flow has 
increased on the nation ' s  highways . The Legislative Data 
Base compiled at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a DOE 
facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, lists 468 pieces of state 
and local legislation regulating the movement of 
14 
radioactive material in its last annual report . These 
regulations may be placed in one of five major categories : 
( 1 )  requirement for escorts , ( 2 )  prenotification of local 
authorities that a shipment of radioactive material is 
moving through their jurisdiction, ( 3 )  special permits , 
licenses , or insurance, (4)  prohibition of the movement of 
high level radioactive material through part or all of the 
jurisdiction ' s  territory, and (5)  weight restrictions on 
roads and bridges (Fore et al . ,  1984 ) . 
Local regulations which restrict the movement of 
radioactive material merely shift the problem to another 
location without improving the overall safety standards of 
the transport 
because local 
system. In many cases risk may be increased 
or state regulations require the spent fuel 
to travel longer distances over poorer quality highways . 
If enough legislative roadblocks are set up by state and 
local governments , the shipment of radioactive material may 
be halted altogether . A case in point is that of the 
movement of spent fuel from the Chalk River reactor in 
Ontario, Canada to the Savannah River Plant in South 
Carolina . 
Until 197 9 ,  spent fuel was trucked from the Chalk 
River reactor to the Savannah River Plant, crossing the St . 
Lawrence River by the Ogdensburg Bridge in New York 
15 
(Figure 1 . 3 ) . This route to the SRP covered 1 , 196 miles 
and took about twenty-seven hours to complete . In 1980 , 
the Ogdensburg Bridge and Port Authority banned the 
movement of radioactive materials across the bridge . As a 
result of this move, Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) ,  
which was hauling the spent fuel, asked the NRC to approve 
f ive additional routes for possible movement of spent 
fuel . These routes passed through Michigan , New York, and 
Vermont . Shortly after learning about the application , the 
Michigan State Fire Safety Board and Department of Public 
Health passed stringent regulations on the movement of 
spent fuel in that state so as to close off access to the 
traffic from Chalk River . In New York, the Thousand 
Islands Bridge Authority and the New York Thruway Authority 
also barred shipments on their facilities . In 1982 , NAC 
began shipping spent fuel through Vermont to SRP . After 
eight of eleven scheduled shipments through Vermont were 
made, the governor ordered a halt to these movements . NAC 
then intended to move the remaining three shipments through 
New York, but before this could be accomplished, the 
governor of that state ordered that no more spent fuel 
shipments from Canada could be moved through the state . 
The next closest place to enter the United States would be 
through Duluth, Minnesota. This trip would require 
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fifty-five hours to complete over a distance of 2 , 384 miles 
( Figure 1 . 3 ) . This alternative proved to be too costly for 
the NAC to undertake . 
Thus , because of state and local restrictions , the 
shortest distance which could be traveled was double that 
of the original trip . Instead of making this inordinately 
long trip , NAC halted shipments of spent fuel from Chalk 
River and filed a series of complaints against the states 
and the local jurisdictions which had passed restrictions . 
In 1984 , DOT ruled that the restrictions in New York and 
Michigan were inconsistent with federal regulations and 
they should be suspended (FR46632-46637 , November 27 , 
1984 ) .  NAC resumed shipments of spent fuel through New 
York in September 1984 , two years after they were suspended 
( Potter , 1984 ) .  
DOT has consistently ruled against state and local 
restrictions which prohibit the movement of radioactive 
material on major highways ( Jacob and Kirby, 1984 ) . Even 
with the knowledge that DOT will strike down these laws , 
localities continue to pass them because they want to 
insure their own area will be as safe as possible. Routing 
spent fuel by the shortest path from each reactor will 
continue to be a source of consternation for state and 
local governments which are in the primary transport 
18 
corridors . Alternate sets of criteria for routing which 
minimize measures of risk instead of distance or time could 
provide a more palatable solution to the spent fuel 
transport question for state and local governments .  
The Risk and Consequences of Shipping Spent Fuel 
A number of studies have been conducted on the risk of 
spent fuel transportation to people and property. These 
studies have concluded that the exposure to radiation does 
pose a threat to the immediate environment around the spent 
fuel cask. The dosage from a package of radioactive 
material depends on the amount of radiation which escapes 
through the container shielding . The dosage of radioactive 
material is expressed in rems (roentgen equivalent in man) 
or milirems ( rems/ 1000 ) . This is a measure of the 
biological damage done to the average person by radiation 
(Rees , 1967 ) . The term person-rem or person-milirem refers 
to the average population dose for the people who have had 
some exposure to radiation . 
Radiation health effects include genetic damage to 
cells and latent cancer . These conditions may not manifest 
themselves until many years after the exposure has occurred 
(FR7140 , January 3 1 ,  1980) . Current theories contend that 
even low doses of radiation over a long period of time will 
• 
have cumulative harmful effects 
should be minimized whenever 
Rhoads , 1978) • 
and that 
possible (De 
19 
all exposures 
Steese and 
Two types of risk are considered in the literature 
devoted to the movement of radioactive material . The first 
is the radiation exposure 
transportation . The second 
health risks and economic 
radioactive material . 
Incident Free Transportation 
from normal , incident free 
category is that of public 
loss from accidents involving 
Incident free transportation consists of those cases 
in which nothing unusual occurs while moving a quantity of 
radioactive material between two locations . No radioactive 
material is released from containment and no loss of 
shielding occurs . Nevertheless,  incident free 
transportation does result in radiological impacts . People 
along the transport route and transport personnel will be 
exposed to external penetrating radiation that has passed 
through the packaging and other intermediate shielding 
(USDOT, 1981 ) .  
The estimated total annual population dose from 
normal radioactive material transportation in 1985 is 
25, 400 person-rem. The predicted result of this level of 
20 
exposure is 3 . 08 latent cancer fatalities and 4 . 4  genetic 
effects annually. While the value of 25 , 400 person-rem 
seems quite large, it is rather small when compared to the 
40 million person-rem received by the total United States 
population in the form of background radiation ( FR7 144 , 
January 31 , 1980 ) . The number of deaths must also be kept 
in perspective when one considers that there are about 
5 , 000 latent cancer fatalities annually from natural 
background , medical , 
et al. , 1978) . 
and industrial exposure (Taylor 
The detrimental effects of radiation exposure in 
incident free transportation are one of the reasons that 
DOT and NRC have adopted the transport policies which 
require that radiation exposure should be kept to a mintmum 
whenever possible. Routes which result in the least 
exposure to the general population are preferred by both 
agencies (USDOT, 1981  and Kasun, 1979 ) . 
Consequences of an Accident 
The consequences of an accident are based on the 
amount of leakage, the distance over which the leak 
spreads , the population density of the surrounding region , 
and the land use in the immediate vicinity (USNRC , 
1977 ) . The probability of an accident , the likelihood that 
21 
a truck carrying radioactive material will have an 
accident , is stratified by the severity of accidents 
( Elder et al . , 1978 and Fullwood et al . ,  1978) . From 197 1 
to 1979, there were 323 highway transportation accidents 
involving radioactive materials . Of this number , 275 
resulted in releases of radioactive material . None of 
these releases involved spent fuel casks ( FR7140 , January 
3 1 ,  1980) . 
Tests at Sandia National Laboratory in Alburquerque, 
New Mexico show that high level radioactive containers can 
stand at least 60, 000 pounds of total force without any 
resulting leaks . The type of accident which would result 
in a force of this magnitude will occur approximately once 
8 
every 1 . 82 * 10 miles (Foley et al . ,  1974) . 
If , however,  a cask 
material is released, the 
determined largely by the 
is ruptured and radioactive 
degree of dispersion will be 
atmospheric conditions . Under 
moderately stable meteorological conditions, the 
radioactive plume 
scene of the 
could extend up to six miles from the 
accident. Under more turbulent weather 
conditions , the radiation plume could extend downwind 
thirty-seven miles contaminating the land and people in its 
path (Resnikoff , 1983 ) . 
22 
Consequences of an Accident - Human Exposure 
The effects of contamination can be very complex and 
long lasting . Direct inhalation causes the most damage 
because the radiation has a direct effect on the internal 
organs . The radionuclieds which fall to the soil can be 
transferred from vegetation, to animals , and eventually to 
people through the food chain (USNRC, 1977 ) .  
Various estimates have been made about the damaging 
effects an accidental release from a high level spent fuel 
shipment would have on the population in the surrounding 
-2 
area . DOT estimates 1 . 75 * 10 annual latent cancer 
fatalities and an equal number of genetic effects due to 
radioactive material transport accidents (FR7144, 
-3 
January 3 1 , 1980 ) . NRC estimates that there will be 10 
latent cancer fatalities annually due to accidents 
(USNRC , 1977 ) .  
The likelihood of an accident which would result in 
the release of a substantial amount of radioactive material 
in a densely populated metropolitan area is placed at 
-9 
3 * 10 by the NRC . In the event this tragedy does occur, 
individuals would suffer severe radiological damage . some 
The NRC estimates that one early fatality would be expected 
and as many as sixty people would suffer serious damage to 
23 
their health. Latent cancer fatalities resulting from such 
a maj or release would be as many as 150 in the following 
thirty years (USNRC, 1977) . 
Consequences of an Accident - Economic Cost 
If radioactive materials are released in a accident , 
nearby property could become contaminated . The expense of 
decontaminating the property and its the unavailability for 
productive purposes are the major economic impacts of a 
transportation accident . These costs will vary according 
to the types of property which are contaminated . 
If radioactive material is released from a cask during 
an accident in a rural area, it will be deposited on the 
vegetation and soil . People and livestock must leave the 
area and the f irst four inches of topsoil should be 
removed . All water usage in the immediate area would have 
to come from wells because the surface supply would be 
contaminated (Resnikoff, 1983 ) . 
Accidents in urban areas would also be costly. Nearby 
public facilities such as schools , hospitals , and 
government offices would be required to close . People 
would have to be evacuated from their homes and provided 
with temporary housing . Businesses , offices , and factories 
would also be closed for a time to enable the 
24 
decontamination of the area. The cost estimates of the 
shut down time� property damage� and decontamination in an 
urban area vary widely� from a low of $1 . 2  billion by the 
NRC ( 1977) to a high of $8 billion by Resnikoff ( 1983 ) . 
Existing Hazardous Material Flow Models 
A number of network flow models have been developed in 
recent years to represent the movement of hazardous 
materials in general .  Some of them have incorporated 
features which assess the risk or seek to minimize it along 
the route. 
Robbins ' Minimum Risk Routing Model 
Robbins' ( 1981 ) minimum risk routing model for the 
transport of hazardous materials determines a shortest 
distance and a minimum population route between two points 
on a network . The shortest distance and minimum population 
paths are calculated using a linear programming model . 
Robbins uses a Poisson distribution model to estimate the 
number of people along each route who would be affected by 
an accident . He then compares the two route population 
figures using a Student"s t-test to see if there is a 
significant difference between the populations exposed to 
the shipments . 
25 
Robbins' work represents an important step in the 
modeling of general hazardous materials flows , but it 
cannot accurately be used to represent high level 
radioactive 
posed by 
materials shipments . There are unique hazards 
radioactive material which have not been 
incorporated in this model . Robbins only considers the 
static population along the hazardous materials route . 
Yet , Yadigaroglu ( 1974 ) points out that the people on the 
highway with the spent fuel shipments receive dosages equal 
to , or sometimes greater than the dosages , received by 
people living along the route. Therefore , a means of 
incorporating people traveling on the highway into the risk 
formulation should be developed . 
Property values along the route should also be 
considered. An accident which results in a leak of 
radioactive material not only damages living organisms , it 
also entails substantial costs to the local government and 
property owners . Robbins ' model does not consider the 
property factor . 
Only two alternate routes are considered by Robbins , a 
minimum population and a minimum distance path . The high 
density of the interstate network, especially in the more 
26 
densely populated Eastern United States , gives shippers 
many alternate paths which can be taken without 
inordinately raising the cost of spent fuel movement . 
Robbins does not take into consideration the 
competition between shipments for certain strategically 
located links . There is no penalty for multiple shipping 
along one link . If several origins , destinations , or both 
exist, some links may be used very heavily by a number of 
shipments between different places . The high degree of 
usage along these links is not considered to be a problem 
in the model; i . e . , there are no equity considerations in 
Robbins' model . There is no provision to shift some of the 
traffic from these heavily traveled links to lesser 
congested routes . 
Reeves ' Covering Model 
Reeves ( 1982 ) develops a model which determines the 
optimal location of hazardous materials emergency response 
centers and assigns flows on a network so as to maximize 
the coverage by these centers . Two algorithms are used to 
determine the best location for the centers . The results 
of both algorithms are compared to determine a set of 
optimal locations . 
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Reeves' covering model approaches the topic from a 
different perspective than Robbins . Its major focus is on 
accident probabilities and consequences . The model does 
not consider the damage done from incident free transport . 
This leaves a significant gap in the analysis of spent fuel 
shipments because the largest component of the risk factor 
is the radiation resulting from the normal incident free 
movement (Maass et al. , 1983 ) . 
The HIGHWAY Model 
One of the major tools used by the Department of 
Energy to predict the flow of radioactive material 
shipments is the HIGHWAY model, developed at Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (Joy and Johnson, 1983 ) . This model 
uses a shortest path algorithm designed by Whitaker ( 1977 ) 
to predict routes on the United States highway system. The 
objective function of the algorithm minimizes a combination 
of time and distance parameters on each link to find the 
shortest path . The model has a number of options which 
allows it to route along preferred highways , find 
peripheral paths around large cities , and avoid zones which 
have legislative restrictions on them. After the shortest 
path is determined , 
total path distance . 
the population is calculated for the 
The RADTRAN model is then used to 
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find the total risk for that path (Taylor and Daniel , 
1 983 ) . 
The major problem with the HIGHWAY model is that it 
does not incorporate any form of risk into its initial 
routing calculations . It is only after the routes are 
determined that the risk calculations along each path are 
made . There is no attempt to minimize risk to population 
or property in this evaluation . 
There is no provision for automatically calculating 
alternate routing patterns in the HIGHWAY model . It does 
not limit the number of shipments over specific links . The 
result of this limitation is that if a number of reactors 
are shipping to one site, the flow pattern will have a tree 
structure (McGuire et al . ,  1984 ) .  Fewer and fewer links 
are used as the spent fuel moves closer to its 
destination . The result is a higher risk value for those 
people along the shipment routes on the receiving end of 
the network . 
Conclusion 
In the following chapters , two models , the Minimum 
Total Transport Risk Model (MTTRM) and the Equilibrium 
Transport Risk Model (ETRM) are developed and 
demonstrated . The MTTRM assigns a least risk path for the 
shipments from each reactor to a repository. This is an 
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efficient way to ship the spent fuel because the total 
risk for society is minimized by exposing a few people to a 
relatively high degree of risk. In this case, everyone may 
share the benefits of nuclear power, while only a few 
suffer the consequences of radiation exposure when the 
spent fuel is 
totally shifted 
to segments of 
shipped. In some cases , the risk will be 
away from the nuclear power beneficiaries 
the population which do not receive any of 
their power from nuclear reactors . 
The ETRM distributes the shipments over a network so 
that all routes which are used share an equitable minimum 
risk . Although more people are exposed to radiation , the 
dosages are at a much lower level than with the MTTRM. 
These models overcome many of the shortcomings of the 
approaches discussed above and address the issues raised in 
the previous cases . They both consider incident free 
risk and accident risk . The emphasis placed on transport 
incident free transport risk and accident risk can be 
by using different weights for each r isk factor . 
ability to weight different types of risk, enables the 
to better reflect the values of society or the 
varied 
This 
model 
decision makers. For example ,  if there is great 
apprehension 
people to 
about the possibility of an accident exposing 
radiation , then this factor can be weighted 
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heavily . The resulting routing pattern will reflect this 
concern by avoiding these densely populated regions and 
highway segments with high accident rates . 
The probability of an accident occurring and various 
levels of radiation exposure which might result from 
different accident severities are also considered. For 
instance, the consequences of an accident which results in 
a breech in a cask would be quite severe, but the 
probability of such an event occurring is very small . Each 
of these accident probabilities and the detrimental 
consequences of radiation exposure are reflected in the 
accident risk calculation . 
The versatility of these two models is also an 
advantage. Even though the MTTRM and ETRM are complex 
models which are specifically oriented toward spent fuel 
shipments , they can also be applied to other types of 
hazardous materials . The elimination of the incident free 
risk data from the analysis and an alternate probability 
formulation for the specific type of hazardous material 
would allow the models to be applied to any type of 
shipments . 
CHAPTER 2 
THE EQUILIBRIUM TRANSPORT RISK MODEL AND 
THE MINIMUM TOTAL TRANSPORT RISK MODEL 
3 1  
The goal of  this research is  to develop a set of 
models which will allow decision makers to compare the r isk 
of transporting spent fuel over a network. The traditional 
model that is applied in this type of research uses the 
shortest path algorithm, which determines min� cost, 
distance, or time routes through a network ( Joy and 
Johnson, 1983 ) . The network over which spent fuel 
shipments travel is the interstate system. In most cases , 
interstate highways in the United States run through the 
centers of metropolitan areas . As a result , a least cost 
route, which minimizes distance or time, usually sends 
spent fuel through the heart of many metropolitan areas . 
This also tends to increase the exposure of high 
concentrations of population and valuable property to 
radiation . 
Another approach to the routing of hazardous material 
such as spent fuel is to minimize the risk of shipping . 
The first step in this process is to determine a measure 
for risk. In this case, the measure will be in units of 
radiation . After this,  objectives must be chosen . The 
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objectives used in this research seek to ship spent fuel in 
a manner which will be efficient or equitable in terms of 
risk . 
Elements of Risk in Routing Spent Fuel 
The risk of moving spent fuel can be considered at two 
levels : ( 1 )  incident free transport and ( 2 )  the 
possibility and consequences of an accident . In each of 
these cases , exposure or threat of exposure to persons and 
property must be considered . 
Incident Free Transport Risk 
Incident free transport will expose the people living 
and working along a highway over which spent fuel is 
shipped to some radiation . The population density, length 
of the highway segment , velocity of the truck used , and the 
amount of radiation emitted from the cask are important 
inputs in determining the incident free spent fuel 
transport risk factor for people on the highway periphery. 
The passengers and drivers on the highway with the spent 
fuel carrier will also receive some radiation. The 
important considerations here are the length of the link, 
the number of vehicles in each lane, and the speed at which 
these vehicles are traveling . 
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The risk factor for the truck crew must also be 
considered . The distance and speed at which the truck 
travels determine the amount of radiation they receive . At 
points along the route, the truck crew will stop to rest 
and eat . Other people at these rest stops or truck stops 
will also be exposed to the radiation emitted from the 
casks . The longer the trip , the greater the number of 
stops the truck will make . 
Each of the above situations has been expressed in 
equation form by DOT (USDOT, 1981 ) .  The DOT equations have 
been modified for these efficiency and equity models 
because extensive data requirements and computation time 
would be required for the original formulations . The major 
modifications for incident free transport risk are in the 
form of data aggregation . Since the study area covers most 
of the United States , the population data which is used is 
at a gross level . The original DOT formulations require a 
greater level of detail for their calculations . 
The exposure factor equations , F , for each of the 
mj i 
circumstances previously discussed are defined as follows : 
Part 1 .  Dose in pmr to the persons residing or working 
along the route : 
p d 
Sj i j i  
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F 
1j i 
= c , ( 2 . 1 )  
v 1 
j i  
where : 
p = Average population density per square mile in 
Sj i a 5 mile band along either side of link j i ,  
d = Length of the link j i  in miles , 
j i  
v = Average speed of vehicles on the link j i  in 
j i  miles per hour, 
c = DOT 1 s  constant conversion factor for use in 
1 estimating the incident free radiation 
exposure factor for people along a link . 
Part 2 .  Dose in pmr to people in oncoming vehicles on the 
same highway as the spent fuel shipment : 
d t 
j i  j i  
F = c ( 2 . 2 )  
2j i 2 2 
v 
j i  
where: 
t = Average traffic count on link j i  in vehicles 
j i  per hour, 
c = DOT ' s  conversion factor for use in estimating 
2 the incident free radiation exposure factor 
for people in oncoming vehicles . 
Part 3 .  Dose in pmr to people in vehicles moving in the 
same direction as the spent fuel shipment : 
d t 
j i  j i  
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F = c , ( 2 . 3 )  
3j i --�3-- 3 
v 
j i  
where : 
c = DOT 1 s  conversion factor for use in estimating 
3 the incident free radiation exposure factor 
for people in vehicles moving in the same 
direction as the spent fuel shipment . 
Part 4 .  Dose in pmr to the truck crew: 
0 . 8  d 
j i  
F = c ( 2 . 4 )  
4j i v 4 
j i  
where : 
c = DOT ' s  conversion factor for use in estimating 
4 the incident free radiation exposure factor 
for the truck crew and people at truck 
stops and rest stops.  
Part 5 .  Dose in pmr to people at truck stops and rest 
stops : 
F = 
0 . 2  d 
j i  
5j i __ v ___ _ 
j i  
c 
4 
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( 2 . 5 )  
The sum of equations ( 2 . 1 )  to ( 2 . 3 ) ,  along with a 
combination of ( 2 . 4 )  and ( 2 . 5 ) ,  represent the total 
incident free transport exposure factor equation . 
p d d t 
5j i j i  j i  j i  
F = c + c 
j i  1 2 2 
v v 
j i  j i  
d t d 
j i  j i  j i  
+ c + c 
3 3 4 
v v 
j i  j i  
where: 
F = Incident free risk measure per mile along 
j i  link j i  in pmr . (This is an expected 
exposure rate, but the term expected is 
not used because incident free exposure 
will always occur . )  
( 2 . 6 )  
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Expected Accident Risk to the Population and Property 
The DOT guidelines suggest that the hazardous material 
truck driver fatality rate, the general truck driver 
fatality rate, or the hazardous material truck fatal 
accident rate be used to calculate the expected accident 
rate for trucks carrying spent fuel (USDOT, 1981 ) .  Since 
data is currently available on the number and location of 
radioactive materials accidents , this information is used 
in the accident formulations because it is more applicable 
to these models (Waste Technology Services Division of 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1985 and USDOT , 1985 ) . 
State accident data is combined with the probabi lity of 
different severities of accidents occurring and the 
resulting exposures from those accidents , which have been 
calculated on a nation wide basis ( Fullwood, et al . , 
1978 ) . These probabilities are used to find the amount of 
exposure which would result from each category of accident 
in each state (Table 2 . 1 ) . The expected exposure rate is 
calculated as follows : 
r 
j i  
= I  
q 
U e 
q q 
I U  
q q 
a , for all j i  in state s ,  ( 2 . 7 ) 
s 
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Table 2 . 1  
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES 
Person-milirems 
Accident of Exposure for 
Severity Probability Each Accident 
Category Per Shipment Mile Category 
1 
2 
3 
Source: 
2 . 4E-8 1 .  7E-15  
2 . 0E-10 1 . 4E- 12 
1 . 6E- 12 4 . 1E- 1 1  
Fullwood, R .  R . ; Mendoza, Z . ; Ritzman, R .  L . ; 
Aron , W . ; and Straker , E .  A .  "Radiological Risk 
Analysis of Truck and Rail Transportation of 
Nuclear Wastes . "  Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Packaging and 
Transportation of Radioactive Materials . Las 
Vegas , Nevada : 933-935 , May 7-12,  1 978 . 
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where: 
r = Average rate of exposure in pmr for each mile in 
j i  case of an accident on link j i , 
U = Probability of a radioactive materials 
q accident of type q in the United States , 
e = Exposure in pmr for each accident category q ,  
q 
a = Accident rate per mile in state s .  
s 
Each portion of the highway has an accident rate, a • 
s 
As the rate increases , the probability that the population 
and property along the highway will be exposed to a 
radiation leak due to an accident will increase . 
Therefore, the risk to the population and property along a 
link will be influenced by the accident rate . 
The damaging effects of a radiation leak resulting 
from an accident will be felt over a wider area than that 
of incident free transport . Population density and 
property type over a much broader area must be considered 
under these circumstances . 
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The probability of an accident which releases 
radioactive material occurring and its consequences to the 
general public are represented in equation ( 2 . 8 ) . The 
population within a ten mile radius on either side of the 
highway is considered to be in the vulnerable zone . The 
population in this zone is multiplied by the expected 
accident risk. 
A 
j i  
where : 
A 
j i  
p 
lOj i 
= p 
lOj i  
r • 
j i  
( 2 . 8 )  
= Accidental radiation exposure factor for the 
general population within a ten mile band 
along either side of link j i .  
= Average population density in a 1 0  mile 
wide band on both sides of link j i .  
The probability of an accident which releases 
radioactivity occurring and its consequences to nearby 
property are represented in equation ( 2 . 9) .  The land 
considered is in a ten mile wide zone extending out from 
either side of the highway. Each land use type will have 
an economic consequence multiplier associated with it . 
Land area types include farmland. single family housing. 
multi-family housing, commercial , parks , and public areas . 
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The sum of the products of  the land area, the economic 
constant , and the accident rate will determine the risk 
factor for property on link j i .  
E = I u w r for all k = 1 ,  • • •  , 6  land 
j i  k lOlj i k j i  use types , ( 2 . 9 )  
where : 
E = Economic consequence of an accident on l ink j i  
j i  in pmr dollars , 
u = A land area of type k in a 10 mile wide band 
lOkj i on both sides of link j i ,  
w = DOT ' s  economic consequence multiplier for land 
k use type k .  
The Total Measure of Risk 
The criterion used to evaluate each link j i  is the 
total risk factor : 
f:J F + {:1 A + {:1 E , ( 2 . 10 )  
1 j i  2 j i  3 j i  
where : 
{:1 = Weight parameter for incident free transport 
1 risk , 
{:1 = Weight parameter for the expected population 
2 exposure in case of an accident , 
{:1 = Weight parameter for the expected economic loss 
3 to property in case of an accident . 
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The beta factors can be used to emphasize the importance of 
one type of expected exposure over the others . This will 
give policy makers a greater set of options to use when 
trying to decide how to route the spent fuel . 
Description of the Models 
The Efficiency Model 
The Minimum Total Transport Risk Model (MTTRM) 
determines the minimum risk route through the entire 
network and sends all the spent fuel along this designated 
path. This solution maximizes risk efficiency by 
guaranteeing that the risk to all of society is minimized . 
However , the sacrifice made by the people along this 
designated path in terms of exposure to radiation and risk 
of accident may be inordinately high . 
S ince it is an efficient solution, the MTTRM seeks to 
minimize risk over the whole network. The path it selects 
usually avoids highly populated urban areas , often taking 
peripheral interstates through less populated areas . Once 
the minimum risk route is found, all the shipments are sent 
along this one route . 
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The objective function for the MTTRM is s�ilar to 
that of the standard shortest path formulation ( Bradley 
et al . ,  1977 ) The sum of the risk factors over all highway 
segments j i  is min�ized : 
b 
Z = min I I I  
b j iE N  
( /3  F + /3 A + /3 E ) X ( 2 . 1 1 )  
s . t .  
1 j i  2 j i  
b 
T, 
b b 
I X I X = 0,  
iE N j i  iE N ij 
j j -T, 
b 
x � 0 ,  j iEN for all b, 
j i  
3 j i  j i  
if j is a reactor b 
otherwise, for all b,  
if j is  the repository 
( 2 . 12)  
( 2 . 13 )  
where: 
Z = Sum of the risk values on the minimum risk paths 
from each reactor b to a repository, 
b 
x = Number of trips along link j i  from reactor b ,  
j i  
N = { i  where arc (j , i )  exists} ,  
j 
b 
T = Total number of trips from reactor b to a 
repository, 
T = Total number of trips from all reactors to a 
repository, 
b = Source node or reactor , 
N = Total network. 
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Constraint ( 2 . 12 )  insures that all the spent fuel will be 
shipped from each of the reactors , it eliminates the 
possibility that any spent fuel will be left at an 
intermediate node, and requires that all of the spent fuel 
which leaves each reactor be sent to the repository. The 
MTTRM produces a globally optimal assignment which is the 
same as the user optimal path, since link risk values are 
constant . 
Since the value of ( /3  
1 
F 
j i  
+ 13 A 
2 j i  
assumed to be a constant for each link j i , let : 
c = ( /3  F + 13  A + /3 E ) 
j i  1 j i  2 j i  3 j i  
The objective function ( 2 . 1 1 )  then becomes : 
b 
z = min I II ( c  X ) 
b j iE N  j i  j i  
+ 13 E ) is 
3 j i  
( 2 . 14 )  
( 2 . 15 )  
The MTTRM can then be expressed with an objective function, 
( 2 . 15 ) ,  subject to ( 2 . 12)  to ( 2 . 13 ) . 
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The MTTRH model can be modified to generate a shortest 
distance or least cost route . Link distance is an input 
variable which can be used to calculate the minimum length 
path. A freight rate for different regions in the United 
States can be used to calculate cost of transportation over 
each link if the least cost path is desired. If all the 
variables in ( 2 . 6) except d are assumed to be constant 
j i  
and in ( 2 . 10)  {J is 1 . 0 and {J and /3 are set to 0 ,  then 
1 2 3 
the results of ( 2 . 15)  will be a shortest distance or least 
cost path over the network . This modification of the data 
and the results it generates leads to the conclusion that a 
shortest distance or cost model is a simpler form of the 
MTTRM. 
The Equity Model 
Another approach to this problem of spent fuel 
shipments is to maximize equity. Instead of putting the 
total burden of radiation exposure on the people along one 
route, the shipments can be divided among several routes . 
This results in a decrease in efficiency and an increase in 
cost . The decrease in efficiency stems from the fact that 
more people in society experience some exposure to the 
radioactivity emitted by the spent fuel . The increase in 
cost is caused by the additional shipment miles which are 
46 
driven by the spent fuel haulers over the alternate minimum 
risk routes . The positive result of this approach is that 
the exposure rate for people along the highways over which 
spent fuel is first carried can be reduced. 
The Equilibrium Transport Risk Model (ETRM )  chooses a 
set of K paths and distributes spent fuel shipments on them 
so that total risk factor for each path used is equal and 
minimal . A set of K paths along the links of a network is 
at equilibrium if ( 1 )  the K routes traversed between the 
origin and destination nodes have the same r isk value and 
( 2 )  there does not exist an alternative unused route 
between the origin and destination whose risk per unit of 
flow is less than that of any of the K routes which are 
traveled . If the path risk values are not equal , then the 
value along the highest risk path can be lowered by 
redistributing the shipments along the other lower risk 
paths until an equilibrium is achieved . The final result 
of the model is a balanced minimum risk value for each 
route which is traversed . 
The formulation of the ETRM is : 
b 
Z '  = I D = I min I 
b b b 
j iEP  
a 
( � F + P A + P E ) 
1 j i  2 j i  3 j i  
b 
X ' 
j i  
( 2 . 16 )  
s . t .  
b 
l P  l = K, and the risk along each path is equal , 
a 
( 2 . 12 ) , and ( 2 . 13 ) . 
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( 2 . 17 )  
where: 
Z 1  = Sum of the minimum equilibrium risk path values 
for all reactors b,  
b 
D = Minimum equilibrium risk path value for 
reactor b ,  
b 
P = Traversed path number a in the network from 
a reactor b to a repository. 
K = the number of paths traversed. That is , the 
b 
cardinality of the set { P  } .  
a 
Equation ( 2 . 16 )  minimizes the risk values for each 
reactor b subject to the use of K paths and each path used 
by shipments from reactor b must have the same risk value . 
The objective function ( 2 . 16 )  can be simplified with 
the use of ( 2 . 14 ) . The ETRM objective function then 
becomes : 
b 
z •  = I D = I min I 
b b b 
j iE P  
a 
b 
( c  x ) 
j i  j i  
( 2 . 18 )  
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The Equilibrium Risk Transport Model then has ( 2 . 18 )  as its 
objective function and constraints ( 2 . 12 ) . ( 2 . 13 )  and 
{2 . 17 ) . 
Solving the Models 
The Minimum Total Transport Risk Model and the 
Equilibrium Transport Risk Model are solved using the Moore 
algorithm (Moore. 1959 ) .  The MTTRM is solved by finding 
the least risk path through the network (Appendix A) . All 
the shipments are then sent from the source node to the 
sink along this least risk route . The number of shipments 
is then multiplied by the risk factor on each link . This 
increased risk factor value replaces the current value on 
each traversed link . This solution gives the minimum risk 
value for all of society. 
The rest of the algorithm solves the Equilibrium 
Transport Risk Model for K > 1 by finding a set of minimum 
risk paths . After the risk values on the first path have 
been updated from the original values on the network. 
Moore ' s  algorithm is used again to find the minimum risk 
path . If the risk factor value of another path is less 
than the value of the current revised least risk path. then 
the total number of shipments is split among the additional 
path and the previously assigned path( s )  so that the risk 
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factor for all paths is equal (Appendix B) . The iterations 
of the algorithm will continue until the same least risk 
path is repeated . Any additional iterations will not 
reduce the objective function value because the same path 
structures will be duplicated. 
The ETRM is a greedy adding algorithm .  The greedy 
procedure recursively adds paths to the solution, starting 
with the shortest path and sequentially adding paths until 
K paths have been selected. Therefore, the set of paths at 
K- 1 iteration is always contained in the Kth iteration 
( Handler and Mirchandani,  1979 ) . 
This type of algorithm which generates an equilibrium 
solution at each iteration is used because the size of the 
network to which the ETRM is being applied is much larger 
than the urban setting where the traditional network 
equilibrium assignment problem is normally used ( LeBlanc 
et al . ,  1975 ) .  The equilibrium algorithm used in LeBlanc 
et al . ( 1975) will generate an equilibrium solution to the 
network traffic assignment problem only at the last 
iteration, but this end result is not applicable in this 
research. Usually, only the first few iterations of the 
ETRM are useful in assigning shipments of spent fuel across 
the United States because later routes generated by the 
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algorithm may be too long and costly to use . That is , the 
reduction in risk is not worth the increase in cost . 
The risk values for all of the paths generated by the 
ETRM can be used to calculate a societal risk value for 
comparison to the individual path risk. The sum of the 
products of the minimum equilibrium risk factor for every 
b 
reactor , D , and the number of paths traversed, K,  from 
( 2 . 16 )  determines the value of societal risk : 
s = 
where : 
b 
I K D 
b 
S = Societal risk value . 
Results of a Sample Problem 
Path and Societal Risk 
( 2 . 19 )  
A sample problem for a simple ten node network with 
one source (node 1 ) ,  one sink (node 10 ) ,  and ten shipments 
is solved using the algorithm described above 
( Figure 2 . 1 ) . A single risk factor is used in the sample 
problem, so : 
y 
j i  
= F  + A  
j i  j i  
+ E  
j i  
( 2 . 20 )  
5 1  
where : 
Y = a single risk value for each link j i .  
j i  
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One beta weight parameter is also used in this example 
problem: 
� = � = � = 0 . 6  • 
1 2 3 
( 2 . 21 )  
Thus . at each iteration of the program, the updated risk 
factor on each link which has been traversed is calculated 
by multiplying the number of trips by the risk factor and a 
beta weight parameter of 0 . 6 .  That is . 
b b 
D = I 0 . 6  X y • 
j i  b j i  j i  
j iE P  
a 
where : 
b 
( 2 . 22 )  
D = risk value along link j i  on the min� risk 
j i  path from reactor b .  Since this is a single 
reactor example. b=1 . 
On the first iteration, the least risk path ( 1-6-7-10)  
is  selected. All 10 shipments are sent along this route . 
The resulting change in risk value along each link is 
determined by ( 2 . 22) . For example, link 1-6 has an initial 
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risk value of 40 . When this value is incorporated into 
( 2 . 22 ) ,  the result is : 
D = 0 . 6  * 10 * 40 = 240 • 
16 
The same principle holds true for links 6-7  and 7 - 10 
(Figure 2 . 2 ) . The sum of the increase link values is : 
540 = 240 + 180 + 120 , 
(Table 2 . 2) . This is the solution to the Minimum Total 
Transport Risk Model which minimizes societal risk . 
The next series of iterations solves the Equilibrium 
Transport Risk Model . In the second intention, a lower 
value route is found . The route ( 1 -8-9-10)  has a risk 
value of 200 . The spent fuel loads are then split between 
these two paths with 6 . 9  shipments going on path one and 
3 . 1  on path two (Figure 2 . 3 ) . The path risk value is also 
decreased from 540 to 372 in the second iteration 
(Table 2 . 2) . In the third iteration a path of ( 1-2-4-5-10)  
is  chosen . The change in shipment paths results in 5 . 6  
shipments being sent over the first path, 2 . 5  over the 
second, and 1 . 9  over the third (Figure 2 . 4 ) . The path r isk 
value again declines to 300 (Table 2 . 2) .  The final 
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RISK FACTORS 
Path 
Risk 
540 
372 
300 
254 
Societal 
Risk 
540 
744 
900 
1 , 016 
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iteration splits the routes among four paths and the path 
risk value is reduced to 254 ( Figure 2 . 5  and Table 2 . 2) . 
The result is an equilibrium of risk on the traversed 
highway routes of the network. The risk value for all 
routes is the same number and no additional route would 
have a lower value . 
The total risk for all of society can also be 
calculated (Table 2 . 2) .  This value is obtained by 
multiplying the risk factor value for the paths by the 
number of paths at each iteration, as in equation ( 2 . 19 ) . 
The first path gives the lowest MTTRM value since this is 
the minimum risk path. As the number of paths increases, 
the overall exposure rate grows larger . The first 
iteration generates a MTTRM value of 540 . The second 
iteration increases this value to 744 . The three paths 
generated have a total risk factor of 900 . The last 
iteration of four routes increases the total societal risk 
factor to 1 , 016 . 
The results of the sample problem show that there is 
usually an inverse relationship between the total risk 
factor for society and that for the individual path. In 
the example network, if the Min� Total Transport Risk 
Model is run, the total risk factor will be 540 for 
individuals along the traversed path. If the Equilibrium 
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Risk Transport Model is used and four paths are chosen� the 
risk factor for individuals along the initially traversed 
highway paths is reduced by 53 percent � but the risk to 
society will be increased by 87 percent . 
The curve in Figure 2 . 6  provides information on the 
trade off between societal safety and individual path 
safety . The slope of the curve gives an indication of the 
degree of difference between the two risk factor measures . 
The steeper the slope, the greater the difference between 
path risk and societal risk . There is a major trade off 
between sending all shipments on a path and splitting them 
between two paths . The decrease in efficiency when the 
shipments are split into two paths may be offset by the 30 
percent reduction in path risk . But , if the trade off 
between two and three paths or three and four paths is 
considered, the differences become rather small because the 
curve is flatter . The increases in societal risk may be 
too great to j ustify the decrease in path risk . 
Risk and Distance 
The risk factors generated by the MTTRM and ETRM also 
can be compared with a more commonly used shortest path 
model� like HIGHWAY ( Joy and Johnson� 1983 ) . If only 
distance is minimized over the same sample network used 
6 1  
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before (Figure 2 . 7 ) ,  the risk factor along this mintmum 
distance route can be compared with that of MTTRM and ETRM 
risk factor . A risk value of 700 is obtained along the 55 
mile path ( 1 -4-5-7-9- 10 ) when a shortest path algorithm is 
run for distance . This is much higher that that of the 
models which have the minimization of risk as one of their 
maj or objectives . The 
distance of 220 miles , 
initial mintmum risk path covers a 
but only has a risk value of 90 . 
There is , in this case, a trade off between distance and 
risk . A 75 percent reduction in mileage results in an 678 
percent increase in risk . 
Conclusion 
Equity and efficiency can only be maximized at the 
same time when the population is uniformly distributed and 
has equal access to transportation (Morrill, 1974 ) .  In 
reality, it is impossible to maximize efficiency and equity 
at the same time because these uniform conditions do not 
exist (Mumphrey and Wolpert , p .  1973 ) . When the range of 
solutions between the most efficient path and the most 
equitable set of paths is compared, policy makers can 
better understand the logical alternatives which are 
available. They can compare the risk to society with the 
risk to people living along each individual highway segment 
and choose a path or set of paths which will satisfy the 
6 3  
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efficiency and equity constraints that are placed on 
shipping the spent fuel . 
Figure 2 . 6  ( p .  62) and Table 2 . 2  ( p .  56 ) provide a 
logical means by which the efficiency and equity of risk in 
shipping spent fuel can be evaluated .  They give government 
officials at each 
authorities such as 
level a gauge to measure risk . Central 
DOE, DOT, NRC , and commercial freight 
haulers will strive for an efficient minimum cost or 
minimum risk shipment pattern for the movement of spent 
fuel . Thus , this group would advocate a one or two path 
scenario . By contrast, state and local officials may like 
to see a more dispersed pattern of shipments which would 
minimize risk at their local level . These officials would 
prefer a three or four path solution be implemented . The 
models give these different groups an opportunity to 
evaluate the cost and risk potential along a number 
routes . They provide a mechanism to reach a compromise on 
the routing of spent fuel.  
The robustness of  the MTTRM and ETRM provides a 
greater range of options for policy makers than they have 
had in the past.  They can compare path and societal risk 
for a number of different routes and the economic 
consequences of these various options . The next chapter 
implements the two models by showing a number of minimum 
65 
risk and cost paths over which spent fuel would move 
between an individual reactor and a repository. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE APPLICATION OF THE MTTRM AND ETRM TO A SINGLE 
REACTOR AND REPOSITORY 
66 
The first application of the MTTRM and ETRM is for 
paths between a single reactor and a repository. This case 
represents the routing decisions which would be made if 
each individual reactor based its shipping decisions solely 
on the risk generated by its own trucks . No shipments from 
other reactors are considered, so there is no competition 
for links among different reactors . 
Data Requirements 
Data on the characteristics of the network and the 
flow of spent fuel over it are necessary to model the risk 
calculations for the network . The data needed to implement 
the model includes population density, highway mileage, 
vehicle speed, traffic count, and accident rates . This 
wide variety of data is not available at any one source. 
It had to be collected from the publications and computer 
files of various government and private sources . Much of 
the data was obtained from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
Other sources include Sandia National Laboratory and the 
Department of Transportation in Washington, D .  C .  Incident 
67 
free transport risk and the probabilities of damage to 
population and property resulting from an accident are 
calculated using these data . Once these values are found, 
the models can be implemented . 
Network 
A directed network of 137 nodes and 406 links was 
created for this research to stmulate the shipment of spent 
fuel from the reactors to the repository sites 
( Figure 3 . 1 ) .  This network is composed mostly of 
interstate highways . Noninterstate segments are included 
in the network to connect reactor and repository locations 
to the interstate system. 
Four locations are designated as sink points in the 
network . Three of these sites are the candidate repository 
sites for spent fuel in the Western United States : Deaf 
Smith County, Texas , Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and Hanford ,  
Washington. The fourth site is DOE' s  candidate site for a 
monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility for spent 
fuel , located near Oak Ridge, Tennessee ( Figure 1 . 2 ,  p .  8 ) . 
Ten reactors are selected as source points for spent 
fuel shipments in the United States (Figure 3 . 2) . The 
Spent Fuel Logistics Model at Pacific Northwest Laboratory 
predicts that these ten reactors will generate 
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approximately twenty-five percent of the spent fuel in the 
nation between 1 998 and 2025 (Table 3 . 1 ) . 
Average Population Density 
The average population density along each link is 
estimated from the 1980 Census of Population . When a link 
is located within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
( SMSA) , the average population density for the county 
through which it passes is used . In rural regions , the 
average population density for the state is used. 
Link Distance 
The distance between nodes is estimated with the use 
of a road atlas . A node is placed at the intersection of 
two or more links and at the source and sink points . 
Speed 
The average speed of vehicles on the highway is 
obtained from Federal Highway Administration ' s  Highway 
Statistics ( 1983 ) .  The speeds are divided into four 
categories : urban and rural interstate, and urban and rural 
noninterstate highways . 
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Table 3 . 1  
Reactor Sites on the Network 
Annual 
Number of 
Reactor State Shipments 
Browns Ferry Alabama 218 
Perry Ohio 208 
Peach Bottom Pennsylvania 169 
Susquehanna Pennsylvania 159 
Millstone Connecticut 153 
Palo Verde Arizona 147 
Dresden Illinois 144 
Oconee South Carolina 131  
Quad Cities Illinois 127 
South Texas Texas 126 
72 
Traffic Count 
The average traffic count is obtained from the vehicle 
miles traveled and road mileage tables in the Highway 
Statistics ( 1983 ) . Once these two sets of data are known, 
the following equation generates the traffic count for 
rural and urban interstate and noninterstate highways : 
where : 
m 
s 
t = ( 3 . 1 )  
s h 
s 
m = vehicle miles traveled in state s ,  
s 
h = highway miles in state s ,  
s 
t = traffic count in state s .  
s 
Accident Rate 
The accident rate for each state is calculated from 
mileage on the routes taken by radioactive materials 
through states from January 1982 to July 1 984 . The routes 
for these radioactive materials shipments are obtained from 
a DOT data base (USDOT, 1984) . The mileages along these 
routes are then estimated. The number of accidents over 
7 3  
this same period o f  time i s  obtained from two sources : 
Waste Technology Services Division of Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation ( 1985) and the Materials Transportation Bureau 
of the DOT ( 1985 ) . Even though these two data bases have 
information on radioactive materials accidents over the 
same period of time, they do not coincide. The number , 
location, and time of accidents differs somewhat in the two 
data sets . It was necessary to merge the two data bases by 
cross-checking the accident data by time , place, and 
material . Corrections on some erroneous or incorrect data 
which had been put into these files were also made . 
Therefore, the resulting data base which combines the 
information from these two sources should be a more 
accurate reflection of accident rates for radioactive 
materials truck transportation in the United States . The 
ratio of the number of accidents and miles traveled gives a 
rate of radioactive materials accidents per mile for each 
state. That is,  
g 
s 
a = ( 3 . 2 ) 
s b 
s 
where: 
a = accident rate per mile in state s ,  
s 
g = number of radioactive material accidents 
s in state s ,  
b = mileage traveled by radioactive materials 
s in state s .  
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Some states have no accidents during this period of 
time . When this is the case, a weighted average of the 
contiguous states is used to estimate an accident rate for 
that state . That is : 
where: 
a = 
I a b 
c sc sc 
s I b 
c sc 
• 
a = accident rate for radioactive material 
sc transport in state c which is 
contiguous to state s ,  
b = mileage traveled by radioactive 
sc materials in each state c which 
is contiguous to state s .  
( 3 . 3 )  
The combination of equations ( 3 . 2) and ( 3 . 3) gives 
accident rates for all the states through which the network 
passes (Figure 3 . 3 ) . These rates are used to calculate the 
risk values for population and property which result from 
an accident . 
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Transportation Cost 
The transportation cost to each repository is taken 
from a study by Wilmont et al . ( 1983) . The variable cost 
for each repository reflects the difference in freight 
rates in various parts of the country. 
Comparison of Beta Values 
Three individual components make up the HTTRM and ETRM 
objective functions : incident free transport risk, the 
expected consequences of an accident on the population, and 
the expected consequences of an accident on property. 
These risk components contribute in various degrees to the 
overall risk of the shipments . The introduction of the 
beta values gives the models more flexibility because it 
provides the people planning the routing with the option of 
weighting the different types of risk . In the following 
examples , each individual risk value is multiplied by a 
whole number while the other risk values are held at 0 to 
determine the routing influence of each of the risk 
factors . Different beta values result in various routing 
patterns . The three sets of beta values which are used 
here are only meant to show some of the possible routes 
which could be generated by using these models . 
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Because the expected risk values due to accidents are 
so low for spent fuel transportation, the incident free 
exposure risk value exerts the most influence over routing 
if all beta values are equal . The risk values for incident 
free transport are greater than accident risk because there 
is a degree of assured risk from exposure to radiation when 
spent fuel is moved . Since this is the dominant risk 
factor , the influence of the incident free transport risk 
factors is determined by multiplying this rate by 1 and 
setting the accident rate beta values to 0 {Table 3 . 2) . 
Most of the probabilities of a radioactive materials 
accident along each segment of the highway network range 
-9  
from 10 to 
-12  
10 The low value of the accident factor 
is due to the extremely small expected probability of a 
radioactive materials accident . While the probability of a 
spent fuel transportation accident is very low, the 
consequences of such an accident are substantial . The 
personal injury and loss of life and property could be 
great . 
The expected accident risk factors were multiplied by 
a beta factor of 
level similar to 
11  
10 
that 
to increase their influence to a 
of incident free transport risk 
(Table 3 . 2) .  The beta factor could be raised even more, if 
one had greater concerns about accident safety . 
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Table 3 . 2  
BETA VALUES USED FOR EACH EQUATION 
Beta 1 Beta 2 Beta 3 
Incident Free Transport 
Risk Equation 1 0 0 
Probability of Risk to 
the Population 1 1  
Equation 0 10 0 
Probability of Risk to 1 1  
Property Equation 0 0 10 
79 
Comparison of Path and Societal Risk 
Three reactors in widely dispersed parts of the United 
States are selected for use in demonstrating the models : 
Millstone, Connecticut , Oconee, South Carolina, and Palo 
Verde, Arizona . Paths to the Hanford, Washington candidate 
permanent repository site for incident free transport risk, 
expected accident consequences on the population , and 
expected accident effects on property are computed from 
each reactor ( Figure 3 . 4) .  One origin, Millstone , 
Connecticut , is used to illustrate the major model 
characteristics in this chapter . For a more detailed 
examination of each of the three cases, see Appendix C .  
Incident Free Transport Risk 
Incident free transport risk results from the movement 
of radioactive material without an accident . S ince there 
is no accident considered in this case, the beta value for 
incident free transport risk is 1 .  This means that the 
population near the spent fuel shipment is certain to 
receive some radiation as the truck passes . 
The major influences on path selection for incident 
free transport risk are population density along each link , 
length of the highway segment, number of vehicles on the 
highway, and the vehicle speeds . The MTTRM and the initial 
F i g u r e  3 . 4  S in g l e  R e a c t o r s  and t h e  Han f o r d  Rep o s i t or y . 
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iterations of the ETRM avoid densely populated urban areas , 
but eventually,  as  the risk factor increases on these less 
populated l inks , the paths shift to the urban centers . 
Such is the case with the paths from the Millstone reactor 
to the Hanford candidate repository site (Figure 3 . 5 ) . The 
first two runs ( the MTTRM and the ETRM for K = 2 )  assign 
spent fuel shipment paths north of New York City, but the 
third run goes directly through the urban center . The 
first three iterations also avoid Chicago , but the fourth 
run assigns some shipments through the city . 
The initial societal and path risk values are the same 
in the MTTRM . At each of the next iterations of the ETRM, 
the values along the individual paths are decreased by 
distributing shipments over a larger number of paths . The 
addition of a second path provides the largest decrease in 
path risk. The drop in path risk is rapid for the first 
few iterations , but as more paths are traversed, the rate 
of decrease declines (Figure 3 . 6) . The decrease in the 
path risk values by disbursement of shipments initially 
leads to an increase in societal risk because longer 
distances are being traveled by the spent fuel shipments 
( Figure 3 . 7 ) .  But at some point, the decrease in path risk 
values may be greater than the increase in the number of 
paths multiplied by the path risk value . This occurs when : 
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P Z < ( P  - 1 )  Z ( 3 . 5) 
where: 
a a a a- 1 
P = Number of traversed paths in the network at 
a iteration a,  
Z = Path risk value at iteration a,  
a 
Z = Path risk value at iteration a- 1 .  
a-1 
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At this point , path risk values and societal risk values 
both decrease ( Figure 3 . 8 ) . 
Each iteration also brings a redistribution of 
shipments along all the traversed paths . This change in 
the f low of shipments along each path allows the model to 
balance the risk value for that route . The choices for 
routes between the reactor and repository are rather 
restricted as the shipments begin and end their journey. 
In the middle section of the highway network, there are a 
great many alternative paths which can be taken . As the 
paths become increasingly dispersed, the risk values in the 
initially traversed states decline, while the risk values 
in the states which were originally unaffected by the 
routing increase ( Figures 3 . 9  and 3 . 10) . There is more 
than a 60 percent reduction in risk for several of the 
Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states when the first and 
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last runs are compared for the Millstone to Hanford case 
(Figure 3 . 1 1 ) . 
This generalization does not apply to states where the 
reactor and repository are located . If there is more than 
one path in the state, then the risk value for this state 
will increase because a higher risk path will be used for 
some of the shipments in the state. This occurs in 
Washington when the maximum number of paths are used to 
reduce path risk . The original route for spent fuel only 
travels sixty-two miles in a rural part of the state . The 
second, higher risk route covers 200 miles and passes 
through the major urban center of Spokane . This second 
route is used on one-third of the shipments into Hanford . 
If there is only one path in the state where the 
reactor or repository is located, then the risk value will 
remain the same . This result occurs because there are no 
alternate higher risk paths over which to send the spent 
fuel . This happens in Connecticut when the spent fuel is 
shipped from Millstone to Hanford. 
Expected Accident Risk to the Population 
The variables which are of primary concern when trying 
to minimize the potential accident risk to the population 
are the accident rate and the population density along each 
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highway segment . The MTTRM and the first few iterations of 
the ETRM avoid states with high accident rates and highly 
populated links . Accident rates , rather than distance, are 
the major factors influencing path choice . As a result, if 
only the accident risk is considered, the paths which are 
generated tend to be more circuitous than those produced 
with the incident free transport risk values . The least 
risk path between Millstone nuclear power plant and the 
Hanford candidate repository site illustrates this point . 
The route generated by the MTTRM avoids New York City and 
the heavily populated areas of northern Ohio , Indiana, and 
Illinois by traveling south of this region . In the Great 
Plains region, the path shifts to the north through South 
Dakota to avoid the relatively high accident rate states of 
Nebraska and Kansas ( Figure 3 . 12) . 
Expected Accident Risk to Property 
Accident risk to property is represented in terms of 
projected property damage and decontamination costs . The 
cost varies according to the type of area through which the 
highway runs . For instance, the land values and clean up 
costs would be much higher for an accident in an urban 
center than they would be in a forest or desert area . 
F i g u r e  3 . 1 2 F i r s t  Min imum R i s k  P a t h  Be tween M i l l s t on e  
P owe r P l ant and Han f o r d Rep o s t � o r y  f o r  
Exp e c t ed A c c i d ent Rtak t o  the Populat ion . 
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The incident free transport risk and potential 
accident r isk to the population are measured in person 
milirems (pmr ) . The potential accident risk to property is 
measured in pmr dollars . The reasoning behind this measure 
is that the greater the accident rate and property value 
along the link, the more it will cost if an accident 
occurs . 
The MTTRM and the first few iterations of the ETRM 
avoid links with high property values and high accident 
rate states . The first Millstone to Hanford run totally 
bypasses the highly urbanized Great Lakes states by 
traveling through Virginia and Tennessee before it turns in 
a northwesterly direction . In the West , the path winds its 
way through the states which have the lowest accident rates 
(Figure 3 . 13 ) . 
Comparison of Risk and Transport Cost 
The minimum risk path does not usually coincide with 
the minimum cost path. As a result , there is a trade off 
between risk and cost . The model can find the least cost 
path and a series of minimum risk paths . The r isk and cost 
of each of these paths can be determined so that transport 
planners may evaluate the various shipment patterns . 
F igure 3 . 1 3 F ir s t  Minimum Risk P a th Be tween M i ll s t one 
P ower P lant and Han f o r d  Rep o s i t ory f o r  
Esp e c t ed A c c i d ent Risk t o  P roperty . 
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The cost of the shipments initially rises for the 
first few iterations (Figure 3 . 14 ) . At the same time ,  the 
path risk values are falling sharply and societal risk 
values are increasing (Figure 3 . 8 ,  p .  88) . After the large 
initial changes , the path variations become minor and the 
shipping costs stabilize . 
Transport planners can chart the risk of the various 
number of paths and the transport cost for each of these 
shipments . If a budget constraint exists , the ETRM can 
generate a series of minimum risk paths which do not exceed 
the budget constraint . The set of minimum risk paths which 
fall within the budget limitations can then be used . The 
introduction of a budget constraint into the ETRM can be 
accomplished by adding the constraint : 
where : 
f 
f 
I m d x � B , for all b ,  
j iE N  j i  j i  
m = shipment cost per mile for repository f ,  
( 3 . 6 ) 
B = total budget for shipping spent fuel from all 
reactors b to repository f .  
to the MTTRM and ETRM. 
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A comparison can be made between the cost and path 
risk for shipments from Millstone to Hanford. Using the 
min� cost path as a base, the cost of moving 153 
shipments of spent fuel annually increases by 2 . 4  percent 
and the path risk drops by 1 . 1  percent when the cargo is 
taken by the initial minimum risk path. If the paths are 
split into two routes , the shipping cost only increases by 
6 . 6  percent , but the path risk falls by 48 percent 
( Figure 3 . 15 ) . 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents the MTTRM and ETRM in an example 
using a single reactor and repository . The data which are 
used in the example are briefly discussed . The role of the 
beta values and their influence on the final results of the 
models is explained . The degree of importance of each risk 
factor can be determined by the size of the beta value. 
The trade offs between path and societal risk for 
incident free transport and expected accident occurrences 
are examined . As the rate of path risk declines , the risk 
to society increases . The first few paths give reasonable 
solutions which can realistically be used by shippers . As 
the iterations of the model continue, the paths which are 
generated become much longer and beyond the realm of 
9 8  
M I N I MUM COST PATH 
. ,  , 1 58 ,858 7 ,982 pmr 
M l N J HUH R I SK PATH 
. ,  , 1 85 ,600 7 ,892 p111r 
TWO H I N I HUH R J SK PATHS 
. ,  ,239 ,052 4 , 1 73 p111r 
F i g u r e  3 . 1 5 Minimum R i s k  and Min imum C o s t  P a t h s  
Be tween M i l l s t on e  P ower P lan t and 
Han f o r d  Rep o s i t o ry f o r I n c i d e n t  F r e e  
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feasibility for a shipper to profitably travel . Therefore, 
the f irst three to four iterations of the ETRH usually 
provide all the routes which can be reasonably used . These 
f irst few model iterations also provide the greatest 
decrease in path risk and the largest increase in societal 
risk . 
A comparison is also made between risk and cost. The 
cost of shipping the spent fuel increases quite rapidly as 
the first few path shipments are split along different 
routes . At some point , the changes in the route pattern 
become very minor and the cost of shipping stops rising . 
A budget constraint can be introduced into the 
models . When a budget constraint is incorporated into the 
ETRM, this provides a means of finding the set of routes 
which will minimize path risk within a specific fiscal 
limitation . 
spent 
will 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE APPLICATION OF THE MTTRM AND ETRM TO SEVERAL 
REACTORS AND A SINGLE REPOSITORY 
In reality ,  
fuel to 
result in 
Introduction 
more than one reactor will be shipping 
a repository site at the same time . This 
even greater risk of radiation exposure on 
the nation ' s  highways . If only shortest path routes are 
used, the levels of exposure and risk will be particularly 
high for a few Western corridor states near the final 
repository site .  For example,  if the Hanford s ite is 
chosen , North Dakota , Nebraska, Wyoming , Montana, Idaho , 
and Washington will have the maj ority of trips pass through 
them ( Figure 4 . 1 ) .  Even the MTTRM will generate this tree 
structure shipment pattern ( Figure 4 . 2) . As the shipments 
move toward the repository, they will gradually filter onto 
one or two major paths . As a result of this accumulation 
of shipments on these key paths , the people in these 
Western states along the highways being used for shipping 
will experience a relatively high level of risk . 
A more equitable distribution of risk can be achieved 
by the ETRM. The use of the ETRM assumes that there will 
be cooperation, perhaps imposed by the government , among 
v l d t h  o t  rhe I a na 
l nc & ce r es r he  vo l uee 
o t  sh & p.en r a  on 
e spec t r & c  I a n• . 
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P igure 4 . 2  MTTRM P a th s  f rom T en Re a c t o r s  t o  Han f o r d  
Rep o s i t ory Wh ich Minim i z e  Inc id en t  iree 
Trans p o r t a t ion Ris k .  
...... 
0 
N 
103 
shippers of spent fuel from each reactor to a repository. 
This cooperation is in the form of shifting shipment 
patterns when the risk on a highway segment increases . 
Each shipper is assumed to know the flow pattern of spent 
fuel moving from all reactors to a repository. These 
trucking firms adjust their shipment patterns in a manner 
which will equalize the risk values over the set of paths 
from that reactor . Thus , there is competition for links , 
but there is also cooperation to reduce the risk value on 
the paths traversed by trucks from each reactor . 
The incident free transport risk, expected accident 
risk to the population, and expected accident risk to 
property are each isolated for the multiple reactor routing 
case by using the same beta values that were employed in 
the single case examples in the previous chapter 
(Table 3 . 2 ,  p .  80 ) .  Since the basic behavior of the models 
is considered in detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix C ,  a more 
general discussion of path and societal risk and cost for 
all reactors will be included in this chapter . A set of 
maps 
found 
for each type of risk and the minimum cost paths is 
in Appendix D .  The final section of the chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of repository and MRS siting based 
on risk and cost factors . 
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Comparison of Path Risk and Societal Risk 
As in the single reactor examples , the multiple 
reactor runs of the MTTRM avoid urban areas . The MTTRM 
paths generated from 
for incident free 
( Figure 4 . 2) . This is 
the Northeastern reactors to Hanford 
transport risk avoid Chicago 
due to the high population density 
and property values in that area . The ETRM increases risk 
on these rural least risk links and forces some of the 
shipments to urban areas . 
Figure 4 . 3  demonstrates this point with a series of 
maps showing the links over which shipments move using the 
MTTRM and the first three iterations of the ETRM . At the 
third iteration of the ETRM, all but three of the major 
links in the network have been traversed by at least one 
shipment. Thus , as the number of reactors shipping spent 
fuel increases , more of the network experiences spent fuel 
shipments .  
The same path-societal risk relationship for multiple 
reactors holds as it did for a single reactor to a 
repository . That is , the initial iterations of the ETRM 
provide 
greatest 
the greatest reduction in path risk and the 
increase in societal risk ( Figure 4 . 4 ) . The only 
difference is that the risk values are much greater for 
both paths and society when multiple reactors are being 
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considered . Usually, after six iterations , the decrease in 
path risk becomes minimal and the societal risk also begins 
to slowly decline . 
When ten reactors are considered, the distribution of 
risk from the MTTRM is much greater than the single reactor 
case ( Figure 4 . 5 ) . States with high risk values on the 
MTTRM do experience substantial reductions in risk with the 
initial iterations of the ETRM, but states which initially 
have very low risk or no risk, see an increase in their 
risk (Figure 4 . 6 ) . This is what would be expected in any 
move toward more equity . 
Comparison of Risk and Transport Cost 
The cost of shipping the 
during the initial iterations 
spent fuel rises sharply 
of the ETRM because each 
reactor is dispersing its shipments over a wider range of 
paths on the network (Figure 4 . 7 ) . Once the major 
alternative 
stabilizes 
paths 
because 
a 
are selected , the increase in path cost 
the later path changes are made by 
few links on the initial routes generated altering just 
by the ETRM. When these alternate links result in shorter 
path lengths , the shipment costs actually decline . 
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The reactors which are 
generate fewer 
For instance, 
routes than 
nearest to the repository 
those which are farther away. 
when incident free transport risk to Hanford 
Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Arizona is considered, 
only has a maximum of seven paths , while Millstone nuclear 
power plant in Connecticut generates thirty-two paths . The 
final cost for moving each shipment from Palo Verde to 
Hanford is $5 ,516,  while the cost for Millstone is $9 , 357 . 
Thus , the per shipment cost from reactors which are nearer 
the repositories is less than those farther away. 
Evaluation of Repository and MRS Siting Based on 
Risk and Transport Cost 
The MTTRM is used to compare the cost and risk of 
shipping spent fuel from the ten reactors to the potential 
storage sites in this section . The cost figures are 
derived from average shipment cost for each mile multiplied 
by the total shipment mileage . The risk values are 
obtained by summing the risk on each link of the path which 
is traversed by spent fuel shipments . 
The MRS Option 
In each case, the cost and risk value is lowest for 
the MRS site (Tables 4 . 1  to 4 . 3 ) . This result is certainly 
1 1 2  
Table 4 . 1  
INCIDENT FREE TRANSPORT RISK 
Annual Annual 
Cost ( $ )  Risk ( PMR) 
MRS 3 , 623 , 759 22 , 67 1  
Deaf Smith 5 , 773 , 980 35 , 649 
Yucca Mountain 8 , 5 16 , 675 55, 677 
Hanford 9 , 918 , 491 65, 863 
1 13 
Table 4 . 2  
EXPECTED ACCIDENT RISK TO POPULATION 
Annual Annual 
Cost ( $ )  Risk ( PMR) 
MRS 3 , 958 , 735 1 5 , 100 
Deaf Smith 9 , 097 , 477 1 7 , 909 
Yucca Mountain 10, 789 , 323 17 , 014 
Hanford 11 , 996 , 918 1 9 , 306 
114 
Table 4 . 3  
EXPECTED ACCIDENT RISK TO PROPERTY 
Annual Annual 
Cost ( $ )  Risk (PMR-$ )  
MRS 3 , 362, 276 141 , 729 , 152 
Deaf Smith 7 , 409 , 528 196 , 820 , 768 
Yucca Mountain 9 , 944 , 219 174, 341 , 840 
Hanford 1 1 , 356 , 322 177 , 219 , 392 
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reasonable considering the locational relationships between 
the reactors and repositories (Figure 4 . 8 ) . Most of the 
reactors are located in the Eastern half of the United 
States . The MRS is the only storage facility in this 
region. The Deaf Smith, Yucca Mountain , and Hanford sites 
are progressively further west and thus are located greater 
distances from the main concentration of reactors . 
It is important to remember that DOE ' s current plans 
are to have the MRS site act only as a repackaging and 
temporary storage facility. The spent fuel will eventually 
be shipped to one of the three candidate permanent 
repository sites in the West by unit train. Therefore, the 
current risk factors for the MRS will have an additional 
transport risk added to them. 
The determination of the cost and risk for the 
shipment o� spent fuel from the MRS to a final repository 
is beyond the scope of this current research because of the 
need to calculate cost and risk of moving the spent fuel by 
rail . But this is an important issue which should be 
considered before an investment is made in constructing an 
MRS facility in Tennessee . 
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The Direct Shipments to a Repository Option 
If the alternative of shipping directly to the 
permanent repository is considered, then the Deaf Smith, 
Texas location is the least cost site, but the risk values 
vary considerably for the three candidate permanent 
repository sites . Deaf Smith has the lowest incident free 
transport r isk (Table 4 . 1 ) .  One of the main factors in 
this type of risk is distance . Since the Deaf Smith site 
is the closest of the three candidate repositories to most 
of the reactors , the incident free transport risk is lower 
for this location (Figure 4 . 9) . 
The expected accident risk to the population is lowest 
for the Yucca Mountain, Nevada site . Most of the shipments 
to Yucca Mountain from the Northeastern reactors travel 
through the upper Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states 
(Figure 4 . 10) . These states have rather low population 
densities and accident rates (Figure 3 . 4  p .  82) .  By 
contrast , the 
Deaf Smith 
routes from the Northeastern reactors to the 
site pass through the Southeast , where 
population density and accident 
(Figures 3 . 4 ,  p .  82 and 4 . 1 1 ) . 
rates are higher 
The two important factors determining expected 
accident risk to property are accident rates and property 
values along each link. Since the Great Lakes region is 
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the property values along the highways in 
high. This causes the shipments from the 
Northeast to avoid this part of the United States . They 
shift to the more rural Southeastern states . The shipments 
to Hanford and Yucca Mountain then move through the Great 
Plains and Rocky Mountain states where accident rates are 
relatively low (Figures 4 . 12 and 4 . 13 ) . The shipments to 
Deaf Smith must travel through several high accident rate 
states such as Arkansas and Oklahoma (Figure 4 . 14 ) . The 
results of these routing patterns show the risk for Yucca 
Mountain to be the lowest for the candidate sites . Hanford 
also has a relatively low risk , while Deaf Smith has a much 
higher risk (Table 4 . 3 ) . 
In each of the three cases which are considered, 
either Deaf Smith or Yucca Mountain is shown to be the 
minimum transport risk site . Hanford is the highest risk 
and cost site for incident free transport risk and expected 
accident risk to the population. The Hanford site ranks 
second in terms of expected risk to property when only the 
permanent sites are considered . It also has the highest 
transport cost in this category. If similar results are 
found using all of the reactors which are projected to ship 
spent fuel in the near future, then the Hanford site would 
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rank as the least desirable location in terms of transport 
risk and cost. 
Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on using the MTTRM and ETRM to 
represent flows of spent fuel from several reactors to each 
of the prospective repository sites and the MRS . The same 
basic relationships between path risk and societal risk 
which are found with single reactors and repository 
shipments hold in the multiple reactor case . Initially, 
path risk decreases as societal risk and shipment costs 
rise sharply. After most of the major alternative routes 
have been taken, the decrease in path risk becomes 
minimal . The societal risk also begins to gradually 
decline and shipment costs stabilize . 
Incident free transport risk,  expected accident risk 
to the population, and expected accident risk to property 
are each used to compare cost and risk of shipping spent 
fuel to the four storage sites from the ten reactors . The 
comparison of transporting spent fuel from the ten reactors 
to the four proposed spent fuel storage facilities shows 
that the MRS site in Tennessee is the location which 
minimizes cost and risk . If the spent fuel is eventually 
transferred from the MRS to one of the permanent storage 
126 
sites in the West ,  the additional cost and risk of this 
move will need to be considered . 
When the ten reactors ship directly to the candidate 
repository sites , Deaf Smith always emerges as the min� 
cost location, but the risk factor varies . The Deaf Smith 
site has the minimum incident free transport risk . Yucca 
Mountain is the site with the minimum expected accident 
risk to population and property . 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Research 
The primary obj ective of this study is to develop two 
models which will provide policy makers the tools to better 
evaluate the risk and cost of transporting spent fuel . 
This is accomplished by the development of the Minimum 
Total Transport Risk Model which minimizes all of society ' s  
r isk and the Equilibrium Transport Risk Model which 
minimizes path risk . The former optimizes efficiency; the 
latter equity . 
Three types of risk are considered in both models . 
Incident free transport risk incorporates the length of the 
highway segments , population density along the highway, 
traffic volume on the highway with the spent fuel, and 
speed of the traffic into its calculations . The expected 
accident risk to the population considers the radioactive 
materials accident rate for each state, the probabi lity 
that various amounts of the cask contents will be released, 
and the population density along each segment of highway 
which would be exposed in case of an accident . The 
expected accident 
the variable 
risk to property also takes into account 
state accident rates and release 
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probabilities , along with the cost of the accident to 
property owners in the vicinity. Each of these types of 
risk is associated with a weight parameter , which enables 
planners to emphasize each type of risk in their analysis . 
To study the effects of each type of risk on the 
routing pattern of the models , three different sets of beta 
values are used . Paths , costs , and risk values associated 
with each type of risk are then generated. If the models 
are applied to evaluate the actual shipment of spent fuel, 
some combination of the three types of risk would be used . 
It would be up to the discretion of the transport planners 
to determine the beta values applicable to their particular 
situation . 
The MTTRM f inds paths which minimize risk for all of 
society. The major problem with this efficient minimum 
societal risk solution is that it places a heavy burden of 
risk on those people along the few routes chosen . At the 
same time, the people along the rest of the network may be 
receiving the benefits of the nuclear power in the form of 
electricity without having to experience any of the risk . 
129 
The ETRM addresses this situation by spreading the 
risk over a number of paths on the network. Each path 
which is generated has the same min� risk as the other 
paths from any one reactor . The result is a series of 
minimum risk paths from each reactor to a repository . 
As the risk value on individual paths decreases , the 
overall societal risk value rises . This occurs because the 
increased number of trips results in more shipment miles 
through the network . For the network used in this study, 
most of the maj or alternative paths are chosen by the sixth 
iteration . The small changes in routing patterns after 
this may actually decrease the number of shipment miles . 
This results in declining path and societal risk values in 
the later iterations of the ETRM. 
The ETRM terminates when path patterns repeat 
themselves . At this point , no further reduction in path 
value may occur . The practical value of the model is 
usually found in the f irst two or three iterations . Beyond 
this point, the paths that are generated follow routes 
which may be too long to be considered practical by any 
shipper . Thus , even though the ETRM achieves a very low 
path risk value at the end of its calculations , the loss in 
efficiency may be unacceptable . The more reasonable 
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solution may be a suboptimal path risk value which can be 
obtained with acceptable levels of cost and societal risk . 
The length of the trip is reflected in its cost . The 
least cost trip does not usually follow the same path as 
the minimum risk path . As a result , there is normally a 
trade off between risk and cost . During the first few 
iterations of the ETRM, 
path which is added . 
the cost rises rapidly with each 
This rapid increase in cost 
stabilizes when the changes in the path structure diminish 
to minor variations of one or two links in a path. 
The final section evaluates the locational 
relationships of the spent fuel storage sites , based on 
transportation cost and risk . The MRS facility is the 
least cost and risk location for the ten reactors which are 
used in the study. This result is not surprising since 
over eighty percent of the operating reactors in the United 
States are located east of the Mississippi River and the 
MRS is the only one of the facilities studied which is 
found in this region . There will be additional risk and 
cost associated with the MRS in the future because the DOE 
plans to move the spent fuel stored there to one of the 
permanent sites which are now being considered in the 
Western United States . Any study determining the 
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feasibility of building the MRS should keep this additional 
cost and risk in mind . 
If the direct 
considered, then the 
reactor-repository shipment option is 
focus turns to the three candidate 
repository sites in the West . The cost of shipping spent 
fuel from each reactor to the repository is a function of 
the volume of spent fuel at the reactor and the distance it 
must be transported . Since most of the older reactors are 
in the East, they tend to have the largest amounts of 
stored spent fuel and the farthest distances to travel . 
This fact means that as the location of the candidate 
repository site moves farther west, the cost of shipping 
rises . This is borne out in the analysis which shows that 
shipping costs from the Eastern reactors escalate from Deaf 
Smith to Yucca Mountain to Hanford. 
Since distance is one of the primary factors in the 
calculation 
the least 
considered. 
of incident free transport risk, Deaf Smith is 
r isk location when this type of risk is 
Many of the Southeastern and South Central 
states through which spent fuel shipments would move to 
Deaf Smith have higher than average accident rates . Most 
of the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states have low 
accident rates , low population densities , and few major 
metropolitan areas . As a result of this difference, the 
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expected accident risk to the population and property is 
least for the Yucca Mountain site .  These results o f  course 
are based on a specific set of beta weights . A change in 
the beta weights could alter the numerical results 
presented here . However , the locational relationships 
should stay the same .  Deaf Smith would continue to be the 
least cost location . Any combination of beta weights would 
still result in the choice of Deaf Smith or Yucca Mountain 
as the safest repository location when transport risk is 
considered because they are the minimum risk sites when 
each type of risk is individually used in the models . 
Policy Implications 
This is one of the first attempts to introduce risk 
into the routing process as a precondition to determine the 
most appropriate path or set of paths for the shipment of 
spent fuel . Previous models have found the shortest path 
and then evaluated its risk ( Joy and Johnson, 1983 ) . The 
MTTRM and the ETRM provide a more explicit method for 
considering risk in the routing question than the 
previously limited shortest path models . S ince risk is a 
primary consideration, these models explicitly address a 
major public concern . 
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There are a limited number of routes which can be 
taken from the Eastern United States to the three permanent 
candidate repository sites in the West . Currently, there 
are only seven interstate highways which serve as major 
east-west corridors ( !94 , !90 , ISO , !70 , !40 , !20 , and 
!10 ) . Even with this limited number of routes the 
combination of paths which can be taken between the Eastern 
reactors and Western repositories is enormous . One of the 
runs of the ETRM generated over eighty different paths 
between Millstone nuclear power plant in Connecticut and 
the Hanford candidate repository site in Washington . The 
only way to compare these alternative paths is by some 
logical means of measure of risk and cost . The MTTRM and 
ETRM provide this means of measure. 
The MTTRM and ETRM give the policy makers at different 
levels of a government a means by which to judge the cost 
and risk of various routing alternatives . Each iteration 
generates a different risk value for society and people 
along the chosen paths . These risk and cost values can be 
considered by decision makers at the local, state, and 
national level to determine which set of paths will be the 
best compromise solution . 
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An example of this policy application can be seen in 
the case of shipping spent fuel from Millstone to Hanford 
(Figure 5 . 1 ) .  The MTTRM path runs through Iowa and 
Nebraska . These two states experience high levels of 
exposure on this mintmum risk run of 809 and 1 , 190 pmr, 
respectively. When two paths are generated, the risk in 
Iowa and Nebraska drop to 428 and 629 pmr , respectively, 
while the risk in their neighboring states of Missouri is 
322 pmr and Kansas is 535 pmr . By using these models , 
state officials , DOE, and NRC should be able to assess the 
trade offs in risk and determine how the routing should 
take place. Clearly, each model will have its own 
proponents .  
efficiency 
Indeed, if the trade off between equity and 
is studied , each level of equity may have 
different sets of advocates . 
Future Research 
There are a number of possibilities for expanding the 
scope of the research into shipping spent fuel using the 
MTTRM and ETRM. Some of these steps can be accomplished 
with relative ease, while others will require considerable 
time and effort . 
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Risk Units 
A primary concern for the models to be implemented is 
that of the risk units . Currently, the incident free 
transport risk and expected accident risk to the population 
are measured in person milirems . The expected accident 
risk to property is measured in person milirem dollars . 
The current research has avoided the problem of combining 
these different units by treating each of them as a 
separate case . 
If these three types of risk are combined , then the 
units associated with each of them would need to be 
eliminated or changed to the same form. The beta weights 
can be used to accomplish this task . 
The beta weights can be used to eliminate the risk 
units by simply multiplying them by the inverse of the 
units associated with a particular type of risk . This will 
result in a unitless risk figure which can be used only for 
ordinal comparisons . 
The beta weights can also be used to convert the risk 
units to some common form. This can be accomplished by 
determining the number of deaths or cancers associated with 
each level of exposure in person milirems . The cost of 
these deaths and cancers can then be determined and 
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combined with the economic losses to property in the form 
of lost production and decontamination costs . 
Link Deletions 
One of the easiest and most practical steps which can 
be taken to improve the usefulness of the models is to 
incorporate the ability to delete certain links from the 
network. If there is concern about specific links in the 
highway which have too high a population density living 
along them or a very high accident rate or some link 
contains a feature such as a bridge or tunnel which policy 
makers and safety experts feel should be avoided by spent 
fuel shippers all together , a constraint can be added to 
the models which will remove these links . For example , a 
requirement which stipulates that spent fuel cannot be 
transported along a segment of highway whose population 
density is more than a minimum level, can be represented by 
the constraint : 
X = 0 ,  for every j , i E g,  ( 5 . 1 )  
j i  
where : 
* 
g = { j , i  p � p } , 
* 
p = minimum population density along link j i .  
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If ( 5 . 1 ) is added to the MTTRM and ETRM, the flows along 
the designated link j i  would be eliminated . 
A similar constraint ( 5 . 1 )  could be used for 
legislative restrictions on the movement of spent fuel over 
* 
links j i .  The definitions of g and p would need only 
change to : 
* 
g = { j , i p = p } ,  
* 
p = legal restriction which prohibits the movement 
of spent fuel over link j i .  
This type of constraint can be incorporated in the MTTRM 
and ETRM to reflect DOT, NRC, state, and local restrictions 
on certain links . 
MRS Risk and Cost Calculations 
The risk and cost figures for the MRS have an 
additional component which has not been considered in this 
research. The spent fuel will eventually be shipped from 
the MRS to a permanent repository site by unit train . 
Therefore, the cost and risk for this transfer should be 
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added to the original values for the movement from the 
reactors to the MRS . 
This risk should be a constant C for each candidate 
f 
permanent repository site f .  The question arises as to 
whether the risk of shipping spent fuel to the MRS and then 
shipping it to a permanent repository at a later date is 
less than the risk of shipping the spent fuel directly to a 
repository site . This can be represented by the equation: 
� R  , then MRS is transport 
f risk effective , ( 5 . 2) 
R + c 
m f > R , then MRS is not transport 
f risk effective, 
where : 
R = risk value for shipping all spent fuel to the 
m MRS , 
C = constant representing the risk of shipping 
f the spent fuel from the MRS to a permanent 
repository f by unit train, 
R = risk value for shipping all spent fuel to 
f candidate permanent repository site f .  
If the combined risk o f  shipping spent fuel from all 
the reactors to the MRS and the risk of forwarding it to a 
permanent repository is less than or equal to the risk of 
shipping the spent fuel directly to the permanent 
repository site , then it might be worthwhile to build the 
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MRS . On the other hand, if the shipping risk using the MRS 
as an interim storage facility is greater than the risk of 
moving the spent fuel directly to the permanent repository 
site , the justification for the MRS would be very 
questionable . 
The same general relationship holds for the transport 
cost . The cost of building the MRS would need to be 
incorporated into C along with the transport cost of the 
f 
unit train when this factor is considered. 
Multiple Repositories 
Eventually, DOE is planning to build a second 
repository in the Eastern United States . This Eastern 
repository will beg in taking spent fuel as the Western 
repository reaches capacity. If DOE moves its construction 
t ime schedule forward to build the two repositories 
simultaneously, this would allow the reactors to have the 
option of shipping to two repositories . The transport cost 
and risk should be reduced if this scenario occurs . Each 
reactor could ship to the repository which is determined to 
be the least risk or least cost path or series of paths 
from it . A determination could also be made on the savings 
in transport cost and risk to see if building two 
repositories at once would be feasible . 
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The MTTRM can be modified to solve this problem as 
follows : 
s . t .  
bf 
Z = min I I I I c x 
f b j iEN j i  j i  
( 2 . 12) , ( 2 . 13 ) ,  and 
every reactor sends its shipments to the 
least cost or least risk repository f .  
where : 
f = a repository. 
The ETRM should be changed as follows : 
z •  : I  D 
f b 
bf 
= I I min 
f b 
bf 
I (c  X 
b j i  j i  
j iEP  
a 
) , 
( 5 . 3 ) 
( 5 . 4 )  
( 5 . 5 )  
such that constraints ( 2 . 12) , ( 2 . 13 ) ,  ( 2 . 17 ) ,  and ( 5 . 4 )  are 
satisfied. 
If DOE decides to build each of the repositories the 
same size, then it will not be possible to minimize risk or 
cost in shipping from all reactors , but the construction 
cost using duplicate plans might be less expensive than 
building two reactors of different sizes . In this case, 
constraint ( 5 . 4) would be substituted with: 
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b 
I I C X 
if 
= C, for all f ,  ( 5 . 6 ) 
i b if 
where : 
C = the number of shipments which each repository f 
can receive . 
Changes Over Time 
One last extension of the models might consider the 
element of time. As spent fuel ages , its degree of 
radioactive emissions decrease .  Thus , it is much safer to 
ship f ifteen year old spent fuel than it is to ship f ive 
year old spent fuel . Other factors such as population 
density, land values , accident rates , and the highway 
network may also change over time . A general 
representation of minimizing the ETRM shipment risk over 
time is : 
s . t .  
min I. Z a 
t t t 
( 2 . 12 ) ,  ( 2 . 13 ) ,  and ( 2 . 17 ) ,  
where : 
( 5 . 7 )  
Z = risk of shipping spent fuel from reactors to a 
t repository during time period t ,  
a = adjustment factor for time period t .  
t 
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The solution to this type of problem would involve dynamic 
programming techniques (Wagner , 1 975) . 
Problems and Limitations 
The results of any model are only as good as the 
quality of the data which are used . The MTTRM and ETRM 
models use a very gross level of data because of the large 
area over which the highway network of the United States 
extends . The population , land value, and accident rate 
units along each link are estimated at a high level of 
aggregation . Not all major highway segments are included 
either . If the models are to be applied to represent the 
risk and cost figures from all reactors to each of the 
repository sites , then a much finer level of detail should 
be used in the data base for population density ,  land use, 
and accident rates . 
The areal units over which the change in risk is 
measured are much too large . The state units which are 
used may have several interstate highways running through 
them. When the shipments are dispersed over a number of 
paths , it is difficult to see the areal change in risk at 
the state level . The county level is much more appropriate 
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since it would reflect the change in risk for a single 
highway running through that area . 
Few studies have been done on release probabilities of 
spent fuel in highway accidents . Once a final cask design 
is approved for shipping of spent fuel, extensive testing 
should be done on the container to determine the degree of 
leakage at each level of accident severity . When this 
determination has been made, new probability figures could 
be incorporated in the accident risk calculations for 
population and property. 
The MTTRM and ETRM are single mode models . Much of 
the spent fuel will be shipped by rai l .  This factor of 
exclusive highway use , limits the models scope of operation 
to those reactors without rail access and those with rail 
connections who still plan to use trucks for shipping spent 
fuel . It also leaves the question of the additional risk 
and cost of the unit train which should be incorporated 
into the MRS calculations . 
There is no present way to use these two models with 
rail traffic because it would require a different routing 
algorithm . Rail routing algorithms usually maximize the 
distance over which one company hauls the shipment before 
it turns its cargo over to another company to complete the 
trip . A shortest path algorithm is used between the source 
145 
and the sink, but at each intersection where two different 
rail systems interconnect , there is a penalty function for 
that transfer ( Peterson, 1983 ) . Adapting the HTTRM and 
ETRM to this type of algorithm must await further research. 
Final Remarks 
Despite these limitations , the basic structure of the 
models is valid . That is , incorporating risk , 
probabilities of accidents , and questions of equity and 
efficiency into the routing decision process are steps 
forward . The insights gained into the relationships 
between equity and efficiency will likely hold even with 
further data refinements .  Indeed, the development of tools 
for the analysis of equity and efficiency should aid 
decision makers in addressing one of the major issues of 
our time, the transportation of radioactive spent fuel . 
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APPENDIX A 
STEPS IN THE EQUILIBRIUM TRANSPORT RISK MODEL 
1 .  Calculate risk factors for each link using ( 2 . 10 ) . 
2 .  Calculate shortest path P through the network . 
i 
3 .  Split shipments along each path P so that the 
i 
total risk factor Z for each path is equal ( See 
Appendix B) . 
4 .  Multiply the number of shipments along each path 
by the risk factor for each individual link . 
5 .  Repeat steps 2 to 4 until no new path is found . 
6 .  Report the results . 
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APPENDIX B 
TRIP ASSIGNMENT AND RISK FACTOR EQUILIBRIUM 
Suppose the number of current shortest paths found is 
n,  then : 
I c t = C • 
j iE P  j i  1 
1 
where : 
and 
Let : 
P = The 1-th path . 
1 
t = The number of trips on the 1-th path. 
1 
C = Constant . 
c = Risk factor on link j i .  
j i  
n 
1 t = T. 
1=1 1 
a = 1 c 
1 j iE P j i  
1 
then ( B . 1 )  and ( B . 2)  can be written in the matrix form 
A t = b .  
( B . 1 )  
( B . 2) 
( B . 3 )  
( B . 4 )  
where : 
A =  
t = 
1 
0 
a 
1 
t 
1 
t 
n 
1 
a 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
a 0 
3 
b = 
T 
0 
0 
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1 
-a 
n 
-a 
n 
-a 
n 
Equation ( B . 4) can be factored into a lower and upper 
triangular matrix (Burden , 1981 ) .  
L U t = b .  ( B . S )  
where : 
L = The lower triangular matrix . 
U = The upper triangular matrix . 
L =  
1 
0 1 
0 0 
a 
1 
a 
U =  
Let : U t = y .  
Solve : L y = b .  
1 
1 "  
a 
2 
1 
a 
2 
1 
a 
1 n 
a i=1 
3 
1 
0 
a 0 
3 
a 
a 
1 
-a 
n 
-a 
n 
-a 
n 
1 
i 
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( B . 6)  
( B . 7 )  
(B . S )  
( B . 9 )  
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Since L is a lower triangular matrix, it is easy to solve 
for y.  
Since the values of y and the upper triangular matrix U are 
known, it is easy to solve for t .  
To solve for t :  
Let : 
-a T 
1 
y = ( B . lO)  
n a 
1 
I 
i a 
i 
then 
-y 
n 
t = • for every i ,  i * 1 .  ( B . l l )  
i a 
i 
and 
n 
t = T - 1 t . (B . 12)  
1 i=2 i 
APPENDIX C 
COMPARISON OF RISK AND COST FOR A SINGLE 
REACTOR - REPOSITORY CASE 
Introduction 
160 
Three reactors are used to compare risk values for 
shipping spent fuel . Millstone, Oconee, and Palo Verde 
nuclear power plants send their respective annual flows of 
spent fuel to the Hanford candidate repository site 
(Figure C . l ) . These three reactors were selected because 
they are located in widely dispersed parts of the United 
States . Hanford was chosen because it is the most distant 
of the four alternative choices for transporting the spent 
fuel . The longer distances to Hanford provide more routing 
alternatives for the models . 
The maps in this section , which compare path and 
societal risk, show the first four minimum risk paths . 
This provides a visual representation of the initial set of 
the most reasonable routes . 
1 6 1  
.... 
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Comparison of Path and Societal Risk 
Incident Free Risk Values 
The comparison of incident free risk values between 
the three reactors reflects a number of differences in 
distance traveled, population density along the routes , 
amount of traffic on the highways , and number of shipments 
of spent fuel . 
highest exposure 
When the three reactors are considered, the 
rates in person milirems ( pmr) are found 
in shipments from Millstone, Connecticut to Hanford, 
Washington . The initial path shows a risk value of 7 , 892 
pmr of exposure . The first path goes through a number of 
densely populated areas in the Northeastern section of the 
United States such as the suburbs of New York City,  
Cleveland , and Chicago ( Figure C . 2) .  This tends to raise 
the population exposure rates to a higher level . The 
Millstone reactor is also the longest distance away from 
the repository. The first minimum risk path covers 2 , 969 
miles . As the number of paths increases , the risk to path 
consistently declines , while the total societal risk 
increases until the eighth iteration (Figure C . 3) . After 
this point , the 
and the risk to 
10 , 838 pmr . The 
risk to individual paths slowly declines 
society vacillates between 10 , 255 and 
final path risk value is 270 pmr for 38 
Figure C . 2  F ir s t  Minimum Risk P a th B e tween Mi l l s t one Power P l ant 
and Han f ord Rep o s i t o ry f or In c i d ent Free Tran s p o r t  Risk . 
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paths . The 
reductions 
initial divisions in paths give the greatest 
in path risk. For instance , the division into 
two paths cuts the risk value along those two paths nearly 
in half. After the fifth iteration, the decreases in path 
risk become relatively small . 
The Oconee reactor shipments to Hanford using this 
same set of beta values have an initial risk value of 6 , 281 
pmr . The path goes through a number of cities such as 
Atlanta, Georgia , Nashville, Tennessee, St . Louis ,  
Missouri,  Kansas City, Missouri,  and Omaha, Nebraska 
( Figure C . 4 ) .  The overall trip is shorter than the one 
from Millstone by 210 miles . The states in the Southeast 
through which 
densities than 
these 
in 
shipments pass have lower population 
the Northeast and there are fewer 
shipments from Oconee . These factors account for the lower 
risk values for shipping spent fuel between Oconee and 
Hanford. 
The same basic pattern of path and societal risk 
values holds for the Oconee shipments . There is a large 
decrease in path risk in the first four iterations 
( Figure C . S ) . After that , there is a gradual decline in 
risk for people along paths . The increase to society 
continues for nine iterations to 8 , 095 pmr . It then 
oscillates between 7 , 877  and 8, 101 pmr . 
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Palo Verde is the nearest of the three reactors which 
were chosen . It lies only 1 , 537 miles from Hanford by the 
initial least risk route. It ' s  nearness and the relatively 
sparse population of the West contribute to the low initial 
risk factor of 3 , 862 pmr for the spent fuel shipments 
( Figure C . 6) . This value for path risk falls to a low of 
678 pmr after eight iterations . The short distance and 
sparse network in the West leads to fewer alternative 
routes . Societal risk values gradually increase from 3 , 862 
pmr to 5 , 801 . Then , they begin to swing from a low of 
5 , 294 to 6 , 168 pmr. 
The initial minimum risk path taken by the shipments 
from Palo Verde to Hanford runs west into Southern 
California ( Figure C . 7 ) .  It then turns north through 
Nevada , Utah, Idaho , and Oregon. 
Expected Accident Risk to the Population 
For Millstone , there is a change in the relationship 
between path and societal risk and a major shift in routing 
pattern from the incident free transport risk . The 
increase in societal risk rises sharply from 9 , 850 to 
1 6 , 341 pmr 
it drops 
remainder 
during the second iteration (Figure C . 8) .  Then 
back to between 12, 714 and 14, 437 pmr for the 
of the iterations . Path values drop 
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substantially during the first six iterations , then reach a 
point of diminishing returns . 
The route taken from Millstone by the initial 
shipment pursues a course just south of the initial 
incident free transport path . It moves through southern 
Pennsylvania, central Ohio, Indiana, Illinois , and Missouri 
( Figure C . 9) . It then turns north through South Dakota , 
thus avoiding the higher accident rate states of Kansas , 
Nebraska , and Oklahoma . From South Dakota, the route drops 
south through Wyoming , Utah, Idaho, and Oregon . Even 
though the trip would be much shorter through Montana, 
Idaho , and Washington, the minimum risk path avoids this 
route because of the high incidence of accidents in 
Washington . 
There is an inverse relationship between path risk 
decrease and society ' s  risk increase for the first seven 
iterations of the Oconee to Hanford run for minimizing 
accident risk to the population ( Figure C . lO) . After this 
point , the characteristic agglomeration of societal and 
path risk occurs . 
The path taken by the spent fuel from Oconee moves 
Tennessee, Arkansas , and Oklahoma due east through 
( Figure C . l l ) . At this point it moves across the West 
seeking out states with the lowest accident rates . 
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Only six paths are used by the model for the transfer 
of spent fuel from Palo Verde to Hanford . Societal risk 
values rise from 317  to 851 , while path values decrease 
from 317 to 142 ( Figure C . 12 ) .  
The initial least risk path from Palo Verde heads in 
a northerly direction from the reactor through Arizona, 
Nevada, Utah, Idaho , and Oregon before it crosses into 
Washington ( Figure C . 13 ) . The next five paths branch out 
over much of the interstate network in the West dispersing 
the risk values over a greater population, but at a much 
reduced rate . These routes can be compared with the 
changing values in the risk scattergram for spent fuel 
shipments from Palo Verde to Hanford ( Figure C . 12) . 
Expected Accident Risk to Property 
Millstone and Oconee have similar initial risk values 
of $ 109 million on the first run, but the pattern of the 
path and societal risk differs considerably after this . 
On the routes 
large jump from 
million ( Figure 
from Millstone, the societal risk takes a 
the first to the second iteration to $ 148 
C . 14) . On each successive run, the 
societal risk moves from an upper limit of $155 million to 
$ 137 million . Path values decline from $ 109 million to $2 
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million. The largest drops in path risk are during the 
f irst six iterations . 
The spent fuel from Millstone initially takes a 
minimum risk path along a more southerly route than the 
incident free transport risk and expected accident risk to 
the population shipments have taken ( Figure C . 15 ) .  This 
avoids the highly urbanized areas of the Great Lakes 
states . The path turns back toward the Northwest in 
Nashville, Tennessee. 
The Oconee to Hanford path-societal risk values show 
an inverse relationship with each other for the f irst 
eleven iterations of the model ( Figure C . 16 ) . The path 
risk values drop from $ 1 1  million to $2 million ,  while the 
societal risk values increase from $ 1 1  million to $25 
million . At this point, both risk values begin to 
gradually decline . 
The initial route taken by the shipments from Oconee 
runs directly 
( Figure C . 17 ) .  
from Atlanta, Georgia to Omaha, Nebraska 
It then runs due west to Kansas City, 
Missouri , where it then turns north to Des Moines , Iowa . 
From here, the shipments travel west to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The f inal leg of the j ourney runs from Salt Lake 
City to Hanford . 
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The 
initial 
( Figure 
Palo Verde risk scattergram shows the standard 
declining path 
C . 18 ) . After 
values and rising societal values 
the fourth iteration , the societal 
values drop substantially . They then begin to rise again 
for four iterations before they drop again for a second 
time . 
Palo Verde ' s  first least risk path runs east from 
Arizona to New Mexico ( Figure C . 19 ) . It then turns north 
to Cheyenne, Wyoming . From here, it travels northwest to 
Hanford via Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Comparison of Risk and Transport Cost 
A least cost run was made from each of the three 
reactors to the Hanford repository. This is then compared 
in cost and risk to the MTTRM path. 
due 
The minimum 
west from 
cost path from Millstone to Hanford runs 
Connecticut to Chicago , Illinois 
( Figure C . 20 ) . From here it takes a northern route through 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana , Idaho , and 
Washington . The cost of this route is $ 1 , 156 , 858 for the 
initial risk value for incident free 153 shipments . The 
transport is 7 , 982 pmr . 
least risk path value 
$ 1 , 185 , 608 . 
This 
of 
compares 
7 , 892 pmr 
with an initial 
at a cost of 
When the change in risk and cost between the 
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two routes are compared , there is a small difference. The 
least risk route costs 2 . 4  percent more, but only provides 
1 . 1  percent greater safety. 
The accident rate risk factors generate a greater 
degree of difference between cost and risk . One of the 
reasons is the large weight which has been used to generate 
these paths . The initial minimum risk path from Millstone 
for accident risk to the population is 9 , 850 pmr, while the 
least cost route has a much higher risk of 50, 650 pmr . 
This is because the least cost route runs through densely 
populated urban centers such as New York City and Chicago, 
while the minimum risk route takes a longer less densely 
populated path to the south (Figure C . 21 ) . When the cost 
and risk differences between these two routes are compared , 
a 24 percent increase in cost yields an 81  percent decrease 
in risk of exposure . 
When the accident risk to property on the Millstone 
to Hanford route is considered, there is also a substantial 
different in shipment cost and risk . The initial minimum 
risk route costs 20 percent more that the minimum cost 
route, but it is 47 percent safer (Figure C . 22) . 
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The shipment path from the Oconee reactor to Hanford 
which minimizes cost is the same route which initially 
minimizes incident free risk ( Figure C . 23 ) . Both cost 
$943 , 328 and have a risk of 6 , 281 pmr. 
There is a substantial difference in the pattern of 
flow between the least cost route and the path which has 
the least expected accident risk to the population . 
Oconee ' s  least cost path runs directly from Atlanta to 
Omaha . From here, it turns due west to Salt Lake City. At 
this point, it goes to the northwest to Hanford . The least 
risk route runs west through North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Arkansas , and Oklahoma ( Figure C . 24 ) .  It then turns north 
through Kansas 
for the last 
more southern 
and Colorado . The two routes finally join 
leg of the trip in Cheyenne, Wyoming . This 
route avoids some of the maj or urban 
population centers such as Atlanta, St . Louis , and Kansas 
City through which the least cost route runs . This longer 
least risk route costs 5 . 6  percent more, but it decreases 
the risk factor by 40 . 8  percent . 
The path which minimizes the probability of property 
loss follows the least cost route for most of the way 
between Oconee and Hanford (Figure C . 25 ) .  The one 
exception is in Missouri and Iowa, when the least risk path 
avoids going through the Kansas City area. This one detour 
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increases the cost of the projected shipments by 4 percent 
while decreasing the risk by about 9 percent . 
The incident free risk path from Palo Verde reactor 
to Hanford goes over the same route as the minimum risk 
path ( Figure C . 26 ) .  Both have a risk value of 3 , 862 pmr 
and a cost of $589 , 701 . 
The initial path from Palo Verde which minimizes 
accident risk to the population avoids the densely 
populated Southern California area by traveling north and 
west through Arizona ( Figure C . 27) . In Las Vegas , it joins 
the least cost route for the rest of the trip . This one 
deviation at the beginning of the trip results in only a 
one-half percent increase in cost, but a 46 percent 
decrease in risk . 
The first path from Palo Verde which minimizes risk 
to property value has the highest cost of these three 
examples . 
half of 
until it 
It deviates to an eastern route for the first 
the trip and does not join the least cost path 
reaches Salt Lake City, Utah ( Figure C . 28) . This 
more circuitous path results in a 28 percent increase in 
cost and a 39 percent decrease in risk. 
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APPENDIX D 
MULTIPLE REACTORS TO A SINGLE REPOSITORY MAPS 
The set of maps in Appendix D shows the minimum cost 
and MTTRM paths for the Deaf Smith, Hanford, Yucca 
Mountain , and MRS sites . The incident free transport risk , 
for the population, and expected expected accident 
accident risk for 
risk 
property are each represented by a map . 
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